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Introduction 
Informal labor and city structure 
 
The informal sector occupies a significant portion of the labor market in cities in Latin 
America. According to recent estimates, the informal sector absorbs 57% of total workforce in 
the city of Bogotá, 50% in Medellin, 57% in Lima and 45% in Buenos Aires (Galvis, 2012; 
CNTPE, 2008; MTEySS, 2007).  Part of the existing literature (Lewis, 1954;  Harris and Todaro, 
1970; Piore, 1980) interprets the informal sector as a residual sector or a buffer where rural-
urban migrants queue for formal jobs. Under this view, the informal sector emerges because 
the inability of the modern (formal) sector to absorb the available labor supply. This inability 
in turn is explained by typical conditions present in markets of developing economies such as 
the lack of human and physical capital, the abundance of unskilled labor and the concentrated 
market structures, among others.   Another important part of the literature (Maloney, 2004; 
Loayza, 1996; Rauch, 1991; Mejía and Posada, 2007) analyzes the causes of labor informality 
focusing on institutional reasons, and usually interprets the informal sector as a micro-
entrepreneurial unregulated sector that offers intrinsic benefits, so that being informal is, to 
some extent, a matter of choice (Albrecht, et al., 2009). 
 
The factors that drive economic development and institutional reforms are defined at the 
national or federal level and can only partly explain the incidence and persistence of urban 
labor informality1. Another set of determinants, which has not been yet extensively explored 
in the theoretical literature, comes from the characteristic of cities in which informal workers 
reside. The existence of urban and regional labor markets is a well-established fact (Zenou, 
2009). In Colombia, for example, there is considerable evidence of regional segmentation 
(Galvis, 2010; Mesa, et al., 2008; Ortiz, et al., 2009) which means that workers and firms 
interact in much smaller markets than the national market. Because of this, local factors that 
define the particular structure of Latin America cities (such as transport systems, workers and 
firms locations, and rural urban migration) can have a deep impact on urban informal labor 
and vice versa.  
 
                                  
1 For a review of the concept of informality see Guataquí, et al., (2011) and Garcia (2009). 
Latin American cities display high levels of spatial segregation, usually in the form of large 
peripheral belts where there is concentration of low-income population, poor infrastructure 
provision, and difficult access to city centers (Bocarejo and Portilla, 2011; ONU-HABITAT, 
2012; Secretaría Distrital de Planeación, 2013). In cities like Bogotá this segregation pattern is 
extended to the labor market. Informal workers live in the south and southeast of the city 
(Montoya, 2014), in zones that are far of central areas where formal jobs are generated 
(Bocarejo and Portilla, 2011).  These zones are also characterized by the low quality both in 
the road network and the public transport system and as a result, periphery inhabitants make 
less than 1.5 trips per day, almost half than the high-income workers (Bocarejo and Oviedo, 
2012). Additionally, informal jobs tend to be less centralized than the formal (Hernández and 
Gutiérrez, 2011, Gutierrez, 2011), reflecting that part of the informal economic activity is 
carried out inside the house or in the public space.  
 
The first two chapters of this dissertation study how the particular structure of Latin America 
cities can affect the size of the informal sector.  The first chapter builds a monocentric city 
model with a labor market characterized by search frictions and the presence of an informal 
sector. We assume that formal workers commute on a daily basis to the city center where 
formal economic activity is centralized, whereas informal workers commute less often and 
undertake some of their productive activities at home. Because of this, informal workers end 
up living on the periphery. We also assume that there is presence of informal housing. We 
show that, in order to induce workers to accept a job in the formal sector, formal firms must 
compensate them with the income that they could have obtained in the informal sector. Part 
of this income is the commuting cost savings obtained by the informal worker by commuting 
less often to the city center. The model shows that both a higher decentralization of informal 
jobs and a higher proportion of informal housing result in a higher informality rate in the 
labor market (informality rate from now on). This is because both situations increase the 
commuting cost savings and force formal firms to pay a larger compensation.  
 
The model is extended by introducing rural-urban migration.2 As before, a higher 
decentralization leads to a higher informality rate. This, in turn, pushes the expected income 
in the city downwards and reduces incentives for rural workers to migrate. However, 
                                  
2 In Latin America rural-urban migration has explained 30% of urban growth between 1980 and 2010 (CEPAL, 
2012). 
surprisingly, rural urban migration increases. This is because a higher decentralization 
relaxes the competition for land near the city center which in turn reduces urban costs for all 
urban residents and effectively increases the expected income in the city. Finally, we use the 
extended model to compare the impact of search costs and transport policies on labor 
informality and welfare. The results show that an entry-cost subsidy has a higher impact on 
the informality rate than transport policies. This happens for two reasons. First, an entry-cost 
subsidy stimulates formal employment creation directly and indirectly (through a reduction 
in wages), while transport policies only affect formal employment creation indirectly. Second, 
the entry-cost subsidy affects rural-urban migration only through its effect on formal 
employment creation, while transport subsidies have an additional effect reducing urban 
costs, which ultimately lead to higher rural-urban migration and a higher saturation of the 
labor market. In other words, the Todaro paradox is more likely to happen when transport 
policies are in place. 
 
In the second chapter, instead of imposing commuting differences, we allow informal workers 
to endogenously choose their commuting frequency knowing that commuting to the CBD 
implies a larger remuneration but also commuting costs, and staying at home implies a lower 
remuneration but no commuting costs. We assume that fixed commuting costs are high 
compared with the benefits of commuting to the CBD for informal workers.  As a result a 
segmented city emerges in equilibrium, with formal workers residing in the centre, and 
informal workers residing in the periphery. As before, formal firms have to compensate 
unemployed workers with the income that they could have obtained outside the formal 
sector, which includes spatial costs savings. These savings do not depend on assumed 
commuting differences between different types of workers, but on the optimal commuting 
decision of informal workers. Our results show that location decisions have non-trivial effects 
on informality rates, through their effect of commuting and housing costs, so that they should 
be considered in policy designs aiming at reducing urban informality. We use the model to 
compare the impact and efficiency of four policy options: a subsidy on formal firms hiring-
costs and a transport subsidy for either all workers, formal workers, or informal workers. We 
find that a transport subsidy targeted at informal workers is undesirable. We also find that a 
hiring-costs subsidy is superior to transport subsidies. 
 
 
Informal housing and city structure 
 
Cities in Latin America are often characterized by fast spatial expansion (Inostroza, et al., 
2013), low buildings height and by peripheries where precarious short buildings concentrate 
(ONU-HABITAT, 2012; UN-HABITAT, 2010). On the explanation of these patterns, some 
authors have stressed the role of rural-urban migration under high unemployment, as the 
main force behind the emergence of the periphery and the rapid expansion of the city (Harris 
and Todaro, 1970; Zenou, 2011), and others have focused on the role of the migration under 
agglomeration economies, in turning cities into megacities (Krugman, 1991). However, less 
attention has been paid to the role of informal housing.  If we consider slum settlements and 
durable self-constructions (that avoid taxes and urban standards) as informal constructions, 
the informal housing sector accounts, at least, for 25% of the housing market in Latin 
America.3 Therefore, the informal housing sector occupies large extensions of urban land that 
could have been used by the formal sector, affecting the land market (Smolka and Biderman, 
2011), the productivity in the housing industry, and finally the shape and the spatial structure 
of the city.  
 
The previous theoretical literature on the economics of the informal housing sector has 
focused on the study of slums, emphasizing on issues such as illegal dwelling, or income 
differences combined with land regulations. For example, Jimenez (1985) and Brueckner and 
Selod (2009) study the economics of squatter settlements.  Da Mata (2013) models slum 
growth on Brazil, focusing on the role of lack of property rights, while Heikkila and Lin (2013) 
study the implications of minimum lot size restrictions and the income differentials in the 
magnitude of slums. However, there is not a systematic approach that closely relates informal 
housing with the city structure. In particular, little is known about how land allocated to 
informal constructions changes with distance to the city center, how informal constructions 
can be compared with formal constructions, and how informality affects the size and tallness 
of the city.  
 
The third chapter of this dissertation study how the structure of Latin American cities can be 
affected by (and can affect) the informal housing sector. More specifically, this chapter 
develops a monocentric city model with a formal and an informal sector in the housing 
                                  
3 One in four inhabitants of Latin America lives in slum conditions (ONU-HABITAT, 2012). 
industry. In this model, informal land developers evade taxes, use inefficient techniques, 
neglect the infrastructure for public services, and thereby expose to the risk of being 
punished. Given that intersectoral land mobility is assumed, a general equilibrium framework 
is used in the analysis of the land market.  In contrast with the Muth-Mills model, here the 
relative price of land does not necessarily change with distance, implying that the traditional 
reason for a systematic variation of the buildings height over the urban space does not exist. 
However, a clear spatial pattern emerges. The model shows that as public infrastructure 
decreases with distance to the city center, the land allocated to produce short informal (tall 
formal) buildings increases (decreases) with distance. The model also shows that the spatial 
pattern of infrastructure is not necessarily the result of an (exogenous) lack of responsiveness 
of the State to fast urban growth. Instead, it is an (endogenous) optimal response of the local 
government to the way tax revenues and fines revenues change with distance to the city 
center. Another important result establishes that higher level of informal housing leads to a 
city with a large spatial size and shorter buildings.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter one 
Informal labor, city structure, and rural urban 
migration4  
 
1.1. Introduction 
 
One of the most remarkable features of cities in Latin America is the existence and persistence 
of an informal sector in the labor market (Maloney, 2004;  Mejía and Posada, 2007). In its 
most common form, informal employment refers to the case of workers who are not reported 
as such by their employers to the corresponding national authorities (e.g., they do not have a 
signed labor card). This implies that the informal sector is an unregulated sector (Albrecht, et 
al., 2009), where workers usually receive lower wages, do not pay taxes, do not contribute to 
social security system, have no record of job experience or opportunities for advancement, 
and have more difficulties accessing credit (Perry, et al., 2007). For the economy at large, the 
existence of informal employment implies losses, not only in tax revenues and a heavy social 
protection burden, but also in terms of productivity.     
 
Most of the existing literature analyzing the causes of urban informality has focused on 
institutional reasons. There is some evidence indicating that over-regulation and red tape, a 
dual social security system, and lack of labor regulation enforcement all lead to higher 
informality rates (Perry, et al., 2007; Ferreira and Robalino, 2011). These aspects, which 
depend on institutional reforms at the national or federal level, can only partly explain the 
incidence and persistence of urban informality. Another important set of determinants, which 
has not been yet extensively explored in the literature, comes from the characteristic of cities 
in which informal workers reside.  
 
                                  
4 I would like to thank Ana Isabel Moreno-Monroy, Juan Carlos Guataqui, and the participants of seminars at 
Banco de la República sede Medellín, Universidad del Rosario, and University of Antioquia for helpful comments 
and suggestions. I acknowledge financial support of Universidad de Antioquia, Colciencias and Conalpe. 
Latin American cities show spatial segregation, usually in the form of large peripheral belts 
where there is concentration of low income population, poor infrastructure provision, and 
difficult access to city centers (Bocarejo and Portilla, 2011; ONU-HABITAT, 2012; Secretaría 
Distrital de Planeación, 2013). This segregation pattern also can be seen in the labor market. 
In Bogotá, for example, informal workers are concentrated in the south and southeast of the 
city (Montoya, 2014) where they face long distances to the city centers and the low quality 
both in the road network and the public transport system (Bocarejo and Portilla, 2011).  All 
this means that periphery inhabitants experience very high costs in terms of money, time and 
energy when commuting to the central areas (ONU-HABITAT, 2012), where formal 
employment is mostly generated (Hernández and Gutiérrez, 2011; Gutiérrez, 2011).  As a 
consequence, they commute less than the high income population.5 Periphery inhabitants may 
be reluctant to take on a formal job because it implies a disproportionate increase in 
commuting costs. This is even more likely if informal employment is less centralized than 
formal employment. This is precisely the case in Bogotá (Hernández and Gutiérrez, 2011; 
Gutiérrez, 2011).  Additionally, following the predictions of the Spatial Mismatch Literature, in 
a context of high segregation, the residents of the periphery may not get enough information 
about formal job opportunities, or could be discriminated by formal employment based on 
their place of residency (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist, 1998).  
 
On the other hand, the pervasiveness of informal constructions in Latin American cities is a 
well known fact (ONU-HABITAT 2012). The proliferation of informal constructions is partly 
responsible for the fast sprawling experienced by Latin American cities, especially in the last 3 
decades (Urban Age Program, 2009). New informal settlements have sprung out in the fringes 
of cities since the start of the industrialization process experienced by the region. The result of 
this continuous urban expansion is the consolidation of the peripheral belts. Although 
informal housing and informal employment are salient features of Latin American cities, there 
is not much available evidence on the relationship between the two.  
 
The aim of this paper is to study the relationship between informal employment and city 
structure.  We develop a spatial search model which includes relevant features of informal 
employment and informal housing in Latin America. Starting with a linear city with a unique 
                                  
5 In Bogotá, for instance, poorer workers make on average 1.5 trips a day, less than the average of the rich 
(Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2012). 
Central Business District (CBD) where all formal firms locate, we assume that informal 
workers do not pay taxes, are self-employed, and receive a transfer from the government in 
the form of subsidized healthcare. In this way, the informal sector can be considered as a 
micro-entrepreneurial unregulated sector that offers intrinsic benefits.  This captures the 
view, relevant for the Latin America case, that being informal employed is, to some extent, a 
matter of choice (Albrecht, et al., 2009; Maloney, 2004, Perry, et al., 2007). Unlike formal 
workers, informal workers can undertake part of their productive activities at home, and 
consequently commute with less frequency to the CBD. As a result, informal workers live in 
the periphery. This structure reflects, first, that informal employment is more decentralized 
than formal employment and, second, the existence of segregation.  
 
Next, following Posada (2015), we introduce informal housing in the urban land market. We 
assume two types of developers, formal and informal. Both types produce a homogeneous 
good (interior space) using urban land.  Unlike formal developers, informal developers, while 
producing interior space, evade taxes, access public infrastructure in an irregular way, and 
use inefficient building techniques. They also assume a certain risk of being detected and 
punished. These assumptions aim to capture the most important features of informal land 
markets in Latin America.6  Within this framework, we study the mechanisms relating 
informal housing and informal employment. The model allows us to draw predictions relating 
to the provision of basic public infrastructure, commuting costs and the probability of 
detection on both the incidence of informal housing and informal employment.  
 
The results show that in order to induce workers to accept a job in the formal sector, formal 
firms must compensate them with the expected income obtained outside the formal sector. 
This expected income is a weighted sum of the income obtained as an unemployed (e.g. 
unemployment insurance) and the income obtained as an informal worker.  Part of this 
income is the commuting cost saving obtained by the informal worker by commuting less 
often to the city center.7 We demonstrate how higher informal job decentralization, a higher 
                                  
6 According to Smolka and Biderman (2011), pag. 6: “Informality can open a gap for arbitrage, allowing informal 
developers to reap higher profits than formal developers because they avoid paying license fees and taxes, only 
partially provide infrastructure and services, devote smaller percentages of land to public uses, and offer below-
minimum-size lots. These incentives stimulate supply of informal developments.” 
7 This spatial compensation is different from the spatial compensation that arises when the commuting frequency 
of formal employees differs from that of the unemployed. The latter is the compensation that is present in the 
spatial search matching models of  Zenou (2009), Zenou (2011),  and Xiao (2014). 
commuting cost, and a higher proportion of informal housing (as a result of lower 
infrastructure provision, or a lower probability of detection) all result in a higher informality 
rate. This is because all these situations increase the benefits of not commuting frequently to 
the CBD, and consequently increase the spatial compensation that formal firms have to offer 
as part of the formal wage.  
 
Besides high levels of labor and housing informality, Latin American cities have showed large 
rural-urban migration flows.  For instance, rural-urban migration has explained 30% of urban 
growth between 1980 and 2010 (CEPAL, 2012).  Such migration has raised important 
questions because it has occurred precisely in cities where poverty, unemployment and 
informality are present. This is the basis of the seminal work of Harris and Todaro (1970), 
which explains how migration occurs under a persistent urban unemployment. Harris and 
Todaro recognized that when rural workers migrate to the city, they accept the possibility of 
being unemployed to get an urban job later. That is, Harris and Todaro recognized that 
decisions to migrate are based on differences between expected urban income and rural 
income. In their model, the equilibrating mechanism is the rate of urban unemployment. As 
the urban population increases the unemployment rate also increases.  As a result, the 
expected income in the city decreases, reducing the incentives to migrate. 
 
The Harris-Todaro model has been extended in many ways8, and some of these extensions 
have been useful to understand the relationship between city structure and migration.  For 
example, Brueckner and Zenou (1999) and  Brueckner and Kim (2001) have incorporated an 
urban land market into the standard Harris-Todaro model and have showed that besides the 
unemployment rate, increasing urban costs also act as a factor deterring rural-urban 
migration. Zenou (2011) also formulates a rural urban migration model where the city is 
characterized by both a search matching labor market and an explicit land market. This allows 
him to analyze the impact of distinct urban policies on labor market outcomes. Even with all 
this progress, little is known about rural-urban migration under more complex city structures 
like one that incorporates a decentralized informal labor and informal housing. This is not a 
minor issue because typical rural-urban migrant will likely become an informal worker and 
live in an informal house. 
                                  
8 For example, Zenou (2008), Satchi and Temple (2009), Sato (2004b) and Laing, et al. (2005) replaced the original 
assumption of minimum wage in urban areas by one of wage determination through bilateral negotiation on a 
framework of urban frictional unemployment. 
 In order to shed light on these issues, we extend our model for the case of an open city with 
rural-urban migration a-là Harris-Todaro. This extension allows us to capture simultaneously 
urban labor, land and housing market interactions, and at the same time, it allows us to 
determine their impact on rural-urban migration. In the model, both the unemployment rate 
and urban costs act as an equilibrating force. We find, as before, that higher informal job 
decentralization leads to a higher informality rate. This should lead to lower rural-urban 
migration. Surprisingly, the opposite holds:  rural-urban migration actually increases. This 
happens because a more decentralized informal sector relaxes the competition for land near 
the CBD, reducing in this way the urban costs for all workers and effectively increasing the 
urban expected income.  
 
Finally, we use the extended model to compare the impact of search costs and transport 
policies on labor informality and welfare.9 The results show that an entry-cost subsidy has a 
higher impact on the informality rate than transport policies. This happens for two reasons. 
First, an entry-cost subsidy stimulates formal employment creation directly and indirectly 
(through a reduction in wages), while transport policies only affect formal employment 
creation indirectly. Second, the entry-cost subsidy affects rural-urban migration only through 
its effect on formal employment creation, while transport subsidies have an additional effect 
reducing urban costs, which ultimately lead to higher rural-urban migration and a higher 
saturation of the labor market. In other words, the Todaro paradox is more likely to happen 
with the transport policies. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the second section we introduce the basic 
model for a closed city. In the third section, we develop the static comparative analysis for this 
model. In the fourth section, we introduce rural-urban migration, and show the comparative 
statics analysis for this open city model. In the fifth section we show the results of the policy 
analysis. The last section concludes.  
 
 
 
 
                                  
9 According to Zenou (2011), only policies that take into account the complex interactions between markets can be 
successful. 
1.2. A model of  the informal city 
 
1.2.1. The city 
 
The city is linear, monocentric and closed, and its Central Business District (CBD) is at the 
origin (zero). There is differential job access and the commuting cost per unit of distance is . 
The total urban population is given by N  ex-ante identical workers who live forever and have 
rational expectations. Of the total workforce, U  are unemployed workers, 
FL work in the 
formal sector and 
INL  work in the informal sector. Then, the total urban population is equal to
F INN L L U   .  Unemployed workers can obtain either a formal or an informal job, but 
only actively search for formal jobs. Each worker is a household that demands housing 
services, which are produced from land and public infrastructure by land developers (which 
can be formal or informal), in the housing industry. There is a local government that 
exogenously fixes taxes and fines, and provides infrastructure. Land developers income and 
government income are spent outside the city. Land is owned by absentee landlords. The 
urban land market is competitive, so at any distance x  from the CBD, all agents take the 
housing rent ( ),HR x  and the land rent ( ),R x  as given. In the city there is no vacant land, and 
land areas not used for residential purposes are assumed to be used for agricultural 
production. The agricultural rent is exogenous and equal to zero. 
 
1.2.2. Households 
 
A worker optimally chooses his place of residence between the CBD ( 0)x   and the city 
fringe ( )fx x . A formal -informal- worker, residing at distance x  from the CBD, receives a 
wage 
Fw - INw - pays a housing rent of ( ),HR x  consumes Fz  - INz - units of the non-spatial 
composite good (which is taken as the numeraire), and consumes one unit of housing.  Also a 
formal  -informal-  worker have a commuting frequency to the CBD of Fs  
 - INs -  implying that 
pays a commuting cost per unit of distance of 
Fs   - INs  -.   An unemployed worker, receives a 
fixed income 
Uw   (derived from an unemployment subsidy, rent income or own savings), pays 
a housing rent ( ),HR x consumes Uz  units of the composite good, consumes one unit of 
housing, and pays 
Us   in commuting costs per unit of distance, where Us  is the commuting 
frequency.  
 The budget constraint of a worker residing in the city at distance x  from the CBD can be 
expressed as:  
 
 ( ) ,H i i iR x s x z w     (1.1) 
 
for ,i F IN  or U . Each worker is risk neutral, then the utility function is given by  
)( ,i iz z   which combined with the budget constraint given by (1.1), implies that the 
instantaneous indirect utility function is: 
 
 ( )( ,)i i i HW x w s x R x     (1.2) 
 
for ,i F IN  or U . Using (1.2) it can be established the bid rent function of a worker is:  
 
 ( , ) ,i i i i iw xx sW W      (1.3) 
which indicates the maximum land rent that a worker of category i  is willing to pay in order 
to reach a utility level .iW  
 
1.2.3. Urban labor market 
 
1.2.3.1. Formal sector 
 
All formal firms locate in the CBD and consume no space. A formal worker commutes every 
day to the CBD to work, so his commuting frequency 
Fs  takes the value of one. Also, the 
unemployed worker commutes every day to the CBD10 but in order to search for a formal job, 
then 1Us  .  The commuting frequency of the unemployed worker is also his search efficiency. 
Because 
Us is a constant, it follows that the average search efficiency Us  is also a constant and 
equal to 1.  Each firm is a productive unit that hires a single worker. The hiring process is 
subject to search frictions, as defined in the standard search-matching framework (Pissarides, 
                                  
10 This is only a simplifying assumption with no implications in the main results 
2000). Firms fill a vacancy and unemployed workers find employment, according to a random 
Poisson process. In the aggregate, the number of contacts per unit of time between the worker 
and the firm sides of the market is determined by the following matching function:  
 
 ( , ),Ud d s U V   (1.4) 
where V  is the total number of vacancies. Following Zenou (2009), we have that U=uN  and 
V=vM , where M is the total mass of firms, v  is the vacancy rate and u is the unemployment 
rate. We assume that (1.4) is increasing in its arguments, concave and homogeneous of degree 
1. The rate at which vacancies are filled can be expressed as ( , ) / ( ),Ud s U V V q    where: 
 
 / ,UV s U    (1.5) 
is the labor market tightness in efficiency units. It is easy to show that 0( ) .q     The rate at 
which an unemployed worker with search efficiency 
Us  leaves unemployment is 
( , ) / ( ),U U U Us d s U V s U s q   and it can be shown that [ ( )] 0.q       It is also possible to 
verify that:  
 
0
lim ( ) lim ( ) 0,q q
 
  
 
           and 
0
lim ( ) lim ( ) ,q q
 
  
 
    
Which indicates, on the one hand, that whenever the number of unemployed workers is 
infinite, firms fill their vacancies instantaneously, and, on the other hand, that whenever the 
number of vacancies is infinite, unemployed workers find jobs instantaneously. When firms 
and unemployed workers meet, quantity
Fy  is produced and a wage rate Fw (to be 
determined in equilibrium) is negotiated. The formal firm pays a tax given by T , which means 
that when a firm hires a worker, its instantaneous profit is equal to: 
F Fy w T  . Finally, 
formal jobs are destroyed, following a random Poisson process, at an exogenous rate .F   
 
1.2.3.2. Informal sector 
 
In Bogotá, informal workers live in the city periphery (Montoya, 2014) where they face long 
distances to the city centers and the low quality both in the road network and the public 
transport system (Bocarejo and Portilla, 2011).  Additionally, a significant proportion of 
informal employment is not generated at the city centers (Hernández and Gutiérrez, 2011; 
Gutiérrez, 2011).  All this implies that periphery inhabitants commute less than the high 
income population (Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2012).  To reflect these spatial aspects of the 
informality, we assume, first, that informal workers do not commute daily to the CBD 1INs  , 
and second, that the commuting frequency 
INs   is also the fraction of the informal wage INw  
generated in the CBD (whereas 1 INs  is the fraction generated near or at home). Then, in the 
model, the informal sector is decentralized, and 
INs  provides a measure of its degree of 
decentralization. Specifically, a decrease in the commuting frequency of informal workers is 
always followed by an increase of the fraction of the wage generated through home-based 
work. As we will show below these assumptions imply that in equilibrium informal workers 
live in the periphery.  
 
Employment opportunities in the urban informal sector are created following a random 
Poisson process with exogenous creation rate denoted by . Informal jobs are destroyed also 
following a random Poisson process with destruction rate given by
IN . The informal wage 
INw  is assumed to be fixed and identical for all workers, and also lower than the productivity 
in the formal sector, 
F INy w .  It is assumed that informal workers do not actively seek 
formal jobs. This can be thought as a consequence of labor market segregation.   
 
Contrary to the situation in the formal sector, it is assumed that informal workers receive a 
transfer once at the beginning of their work period of a positive fixed amount b . This would 
reflect the coexistence of contributory and non-contributory health programs typical in 
countries such as Colombia or Brazil. Specifically, when workers are employed in the formal 
sector, they are part of the contributory program and have to give up to part of their salary to 
finance health services. On the other hand, when workers are employed in the informal sector, 
they are part of the non-contributory program, so they are not required to contribute and still 
have access to a set of free health services usually offered by the state (Perry, et al., 2007).11   
 
 
                                  
11 In order to ensure that this difference is only captured in the fixed term b, we assume that all the contributions 
made by formal workers are recovered through access to services, whereas informal workers do not contribute to 
the system. 
1.2.4. Housing industry 
 
At any distance x  to the CBD, interior living space (a homogeneous good) is produced both in 
the formal and the informal housing sectors. The technology in the formal housing sector is 
given by: 
 
1( ) ( ) ,FH FH FHQ x A Z l x
    (1.6) 
where ( )FHQ x  is the formal production at ,x   ( )FHl x  is the land used in the formal housing 
sector at x  (to be determined in equilibrium), and 0Z   is the level of the infrastructure for 
public services at x , which is exogenous and does not change with distance.  Since 0FHA   
and 0 1   are constants, it is clear that (1.6) shows a decreasing marginal productivity of 
land. The formal land developer pays a tax rate  t  over its sales. This rate is constant all over 
the city. In the informal housing sector, the technology is: 
 
 ( ) ( ),IH IH IHQ x A l x   (1.7) 
 
where ( )IHQ x   is the informal production at x  and ( )IHl x  is the land used in the informal 
housing sector at x  (to be determined in equilibrium). Given that 0IHA   is constant, the 
land productivity is constant. The informal land developer may be detected evading taxes 
with a probability 1 ,  where   is between 0 and 1. This probability does not change with 
the distance to the CBD. The punishment applied to the informal land developer ads up to the 
product of the tax t  and a fine 1  . Therefore the punishment is equal to t . For simplicity 
it is assumed that 1 t   which implies that the punishment consist in the confiscation of all 
the income.  There is free intersectoral land mobility which links the two sectors in a general 
equilibrium framework. Land supply at each x is equal to one and must be fully employed, 
that is: 
 
 ( ) 1( )FH IHl x l x  .  (1.8) 
 
The land will always be more productive in the formal housing sector, then is always the case 
that: 
 
 
1
FH IHA Z A
   .  (1.9) 
Finally, we assume that land developer’s income and government’s income (taxes and 
penalizations) are spent outside the city.  
 
 
1.3. Land and housing market equilibrium 
 
The urban equilibrium is characterized in two stages. First, given any arbitrary level of the 
housing rent,  we find, at each distance ,x  the land rent *( ),R x  the land allocation between 
sectors, 
* ( )FHl x  and 
* ( )IHl x , and the total housing production 
*( ).Q x  Given the particular 
structure of the housing industry, these variables do not depend of the utility levels. This 
allows to uniquely determine the city fringe *
fx  and the frontier between the formal workers 
zone and the informal workers zone
*
dx . In the second stage, the instantaneous equilibrium 
utility levels 
*,FW  
*,UW  
*
INW   and the equilibrium housing rent 
* ( )HR x  are found.  We assume 
that production will always be positive in both sectors at any distance x . Then, it is always the 
case that:    
 
 
1(1 ) FH IHt A Z A
   .  (1.10) 
Each profit maximizing land developer in the formal housing sector solves: 
 
 1
( )
max ( ) ( )(1 ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )          at  each    (0, ] ,
FH
FH H FH FH F f
l
H
x
x R x t A Z l x R x l x v x Z x x      
   (1.11) 
where ( )v x  is the rental rate of the public infrastructure at x  and fx   is the city fringe. Given 
that the housing industry operates under perfect competition, the first order condition of 
(1.11) yields: 
 
 
11( )(1 ) ( ) ( )H FH FHR A Zx xRt l x
     . (1.12) 
This condition determines the land demand in the formal housing sector, and because the 
decreasing marginal productivity of land, shows an inverse relationship between ( )FHl x  and 
( )R x   for a fixed level of ( )HR x . This is illustrated by the ( ) FH x curve in Figure 1. This curve 
is read from left-to-right, in a diagram where the vertical axis represents land quantities and 
the horizontal axis represents the level of land rent. In the informal housing sector, each land 
developer maximizes the expected profits given by: 
 
 
( )
max ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )}       at each    (0, ]{
IH
IH H IH IH IH f
l x
x R x A l x R x l x x x    . 
  (1.13) 
The first order condition of (1.13) yields: 
 ( ) ( ),H IHR x A R x    (1.14) 
which determines the demand for land in this sector. Since   and 
IHA  are taken as given by 
land developers, when ( ) ( )H IHR x A R x    the informal land developer does not demand 
land, and when ( ) ( )H IHR x A R x   the demand does not exist. Finally, when
( ) ( )H IHR x A R x  , any amount of land is demanded. This is illustrated by the  IH x  curve 
in Figure 1. This curve is read from right-to-the left in the diagram. The free intersectoral land 
mobility establishes a common land rent in both sectors, which links them in a general 
equilibrium framework. In equilibrium, the land rent ensures that the value of marginal 
productivity of land is equal between sectors and that total land demand equals land supply. 
Thus, the equilibrium land allocation, at each x , is characterized by: 
 
 
* 1( ) ( )(1 ) [ (/ )] ,IH H H FH FHA R x R x t A Z l x
      (1.15) 
which can be represented graphically as the intersection of the ( ) FH x  and  IH x  curves in 
Figure 1.  In this diagram the fixed land supply (which is equal to one) is represented by the 
length of the horizontal axis.12  
 
                                  
12 See Feenstra (2004) for a presentation of the Specific factors model. 
 Figure 1. Land market equilibrium at distance x to the CBD 
 In equilibrium, the land rent is then given by: 
 
 
*( ) ( )IH HR A Rx x ,  (1.16) 
which is the value of the expected productivity in the informal housing sector.13 Note from 
(1.15) that it is always the case that: 
* 1[ ( ](1 ) / ,)FH FH IHt A Z l x A
     which means that 
in equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation (right side of the equation) is equal to the 
relative price (for the producers) of the informal production in units of formal production (left 
side of the equation).  Because both expressions depend of parameters that do not change 
with distance, it is clear that the equilibrium land allocation (as well the housing production) 
                                  
13 The rental rate of the public infrastructure  ( )v x  is equal to the value of marginal productivity of public 
infrastructure: ( )(1 )(1 ) ( )H FH FHR x t A Z l x
    . 
does not change with distance.14 Using (1.15), it is possible to obtain the equilibrium land 
allocation in the formal housing sector: 
  
1/1* [ ](1 ) /FH FH IHl Z t A A
    ,  (1.17) 
and the land allocation in the informal housing sector (recalling that  the city is linear): 
 
  
1/1* 1 [(1 ) / ]IH FH IHl Z t A A
     .  (1.18) 
Replacing (1.17) in (1.6), we find the housing production in the formal housing sector: 
 
  
/1* 1/[(1 ) ]/FH FH IHQ Z t A A
     ,  (1.19) 
and replacing (1.18) in (1.7), we get the housing production in the informal housing sector:  
 
 
  
1/1* [( ]1 ) /IH IH FH IHQ A Z t A A
   .  (1.20) 
 The total housing production at each distance x  of the CBD is obtained adding the 
production of both sectors: 
 
  
/1* 1/[(1 ) / 1 )[ 1 / ]] (IH FH IHQ A Z t A A t
         .  (1.21) 
 
Let  * */ / 1FH FH FHQ l A t    be the building height in the formal housing sector and 
* */IH IH IHQ l A  the building height in the informal housing sector.  When (1.9) and (1.10) 
hold, it is possible to show that it is always the case that:  / 1 1t   , implying that formal 
constructions are taller than informal constructions. Let  * * */ 1FH FH IH IHt Aq A l l       
be 
the average tallness of the buildings. It is easy to verify that this expression is identical to total 
housing production. Then, *Q  is also informative about the tallness of buildings.  Assuming 
that formal and unemployed workers live close to the CBD, whereas informal workers live in 
                                  
14 If  we had assumed a spatial variation in the infrastructure or in the probability of detection (or in any other 
parameter), an intra-urban spatial pattern would have emerged for the informal housing. However, in this paper, it 
is not of our interest to study these intra-urban patterns. Instead we focus on the impacts of the informal housing 
over the city shape, and over the labor market. 
the periphery (an equilibrium result that we will show below), the population constraints are 
given by: 
 
 
*
*
0
d
I
x
NQ d N Lx   ,  (1.22) 
and 
 
*
*
*
f
d
I
x
N
x
Q dx L .  (1.23) 
By rearranging (1.22) and using (1.21), it is possible to find the frontier between the formal 
workers zone and the informal workers zone: 
 *
*
I
d
NN Lx
Q

 ,  (1.24) 
 whereas by rearranging (1.23) and using (1.22) and (1.21), it is possible to find the city 
fringe:  
 
 *
*f
N
x
Q
 .   (1.25) 
Note that the city fringe *
fx , through the housing production,  depends of taxes, infrastructure, 
the probability of detection, total factor productivity in the formal housing sector, and land 
productivity in the informal housing sector. Also note that the land allocation, the housing 
production, and the city fringe *
fx  do not depend on the utility levels. This is a consequence of 
the assumptions of fixed housing consumption and perfect substitutability between the 
formal and the informal production. Now we can find the equilibrium values of the 
instantaneous utilities  
*,FW  
*,UW  
*
INW   and the equilibrium housing rent
* ( )HR x . The 
corresponding bid rents for each worker type are given by the following equations: 
 
 ( , )F F F Fx w xW W    ,  (1.26) 
 ( , )IN IN I IN INNx W w s x W   , (1.27) 
 ( , )U U U Ux w xW W    .  (1.28) 
 
These functions are linear and decreasing in x .  The bid rent for a formal worker and the bid 
rent for an unemployed worker share the same level of inclination. Also both bid rents are 
steeper than the bid rent for an informal worker. Then, in equilibrium, formal workers and 
the unemployed live close to the CBD, whereas informal workers live in the periphery (Figure 
2).  
 
 
Figure 2. Urban land use equilibrium (The segregated city) 
 
With this information it is possible to define the following equilibrium conditions (Zenou, 
2009):  an urban land use equilibrium, with fixed housing consumption, no relocation costs 
and formal, informal and unemployed workers is a n-tuple  * * * *, , , ( )F U IN HW W W R x  such that: 
 
 
 
 
 
* *
F U F UW W w w   ,  (1.29) 
 
* *
* *
IN IN
U U IN IN IN
N L N L
w W w s W
Q Q
 
    
       
   
,  (1.30) 
 
*
0IN NIN I
N
w s
Q
W   ,  (1.31) 
  * * * * *( ) max , , , , , ,0 for each (0,( ) ( ) ( ])H F F U U IN fINR x x W x W x W x x     . 
  (1.32) 
 
Equation (1.29) implies that the bid rent for a formal worker is equal to the bid rent for an 
unemployed all over the city. Equation (1.30) implies that exactly at the frontier between the 
formal workers zone and the informal workers zone, 
*
dx , the bid rent for a formal worker is 
equal to the bid rent for an informal worker. Equation(1.31), in turn, means that exactly at the 
city fringe the bid rent for an informal worker is equal to the agricultural rent (which is 
assumed to be zero). Equation(1.31), together with (1.16), guarantees that the equilibrium 
land rent is equal to agricultural rent at the city fringe.  Finally, Equation (1.32) states that the 
equilibrium housing rent is equal to the upper envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of 
all workers and the agricultural rent line (Zenou, 2011). The equilibrium values of the 
instantaneous utilities for the formal, unemployed and informal workers can be obtained by 
using equations (1.29) to (1.31):  
 
 *
*IN IN IN
W w s N
Q

  ,  (1.33) 
 *
* *
(1 ) INU U IN
LN
W w s
Q Q
      , (1.34) 
 *
* *
(1 ) INF F IN
LN
W w s
Q Q
     .  (1.35) 
 By replacing (1.33), (1.34) and (1.35) in (1.26), (1.27) and (1.28) we can obtain the housing 
rent in equilibrium 
* ( )HR x : 
 * * *
*
* * *
*
(1 ) for 0 ,
for ,
0 fo
(
.
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  (1.36) 
Note that (1.36) together with (1.16) implies that the equilibrium land rent is described by: 
 
 
* * *
*
* * *
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for ,
0 for .
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IN IN
IH IN
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Q Q Q
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   (1.37) 
Finally, defining the urban cost for a worker as the sum of the housing rent and the 
commuting cost, we have that in equilibrium, the urban cost for a formal worker is 
* *( ) (1 ) ( )IN INN Q s L Q   ,   and for an informal worker it would be  
*( )INs N Q .  
 
1.4. Urban labor market equilibrium 
 
1.4.1. Lifetime expected utility for workers and firms 
 
Workers discount future values at a rate r .  Let  
FI , UI , and INI  denote the expected lifetime 
utility for a formal worker, for an unemployed worker and for an informal worker, 
respectively. In the steady-state, the Bellman equations for 
FI and INI  are given by:  
 
    * *1
IN
F F IN F F U
LN
rI w s I I
Q Q
        ,  (1.38) 
  *IN IN IN IN U IN
N
rI w s I I
Q
     ,  (1.39) 
which show that workers obtain their instantaneous utility in each period. Furthermore, 
formal workers can lose their jobs at a rate 
F , which leads to a surplus loss of F UI I . 
Informal workers, in turn, can lose their jobs at a rate 
IN , so their change in surplus is given 
by 
U INI I . In the steady-state, the Bellman equation for UI  is given by:  
 
       * *1
IN
U U IN F U IN U
LN
rI w s q I I I b I
Q Q
             . 
   (1.40) 
 
This equation shows that, besides obtaining her instantaneous utility, an unemployed worker 
can obtain either a job in the formal sector at a rate ( )q   (since 1Us   ), with an 
accompanying increase in surplus of  
F UI I , or a job in the informal sector at a rate  , with 
a surplus change of 
IN UI b I   (recall that b  is the present value of the sum of all the 
transfers received while informally employed).  Given that there are no relocation costs, in 
equilibrium all workers must reach the same utility level independently of their location in 
the city, therefore: F FI I , U UI I  and IN INI I . Using (1.39) and (1.40) we obtain: 
 
     *
1
1 INU IN U IN IN F U
IN
N L
I I w w s b q I I
r Q
   
 
  
         
    
, 
  (1.41) 
  
whereas by using (1.38) and (1.40) we get: 
 
 
 
 
1
F U F U U IN
F
I I w w b I I
r q
 
  
        
.  (1.42) 
  
Then, replacing (1.41) in (1.42) we obtain:  
 
        *1 1
IN
F U IN F IN IN IN U
N L
I I r w w s r b w
Q
       
    
             
    
   (1.43) 
 where        1 F IN INr r q r                and   INr      . 
Denoting the search cost per unit of time for a formal firms as c , we have that the value of a 
vacancy 
VI  and a filled vacancy OI are given by:  
 
   V O VrI c q I I    ,  (1.44) 
 
  O F F F O VrI y w T I I    .  (1.45) 
 
Firms are free to post vacancies and they do until 0VI  .  This, together with (1.44) implies 
that: 
 
 
( )
O
c
I
q 
 . (1.46) 
If we use 0VI  , and equations (1.45) and (1.46),  we have the following equation 
determining job creation in the formal sector:  
 
 
 
F F
F
y w Tc
q r 




.  (1.47) 
 
1.4.2. Wages in equilibrium  
 
At each period, wages are set through a generalized Nash-bargaining process between firms 
and workers: 
 
    
1
argmax
F
F F U O V
w
w I I I I
 
   ,  (1.48) 
where 0 1   represents the bargaining power of workers. By solving (1.48) we obtain:  
 
         *1 1 1 1
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 The first term in (1.49) is the compensation that firms must pay to induce workers to accept a 
job in the formal sector. The compensation is the fraction  1   of the expected income 
obtained by the worker outside the formal sector, which is a weighted average of the 
unemployed current income 
Uw  and the informal worker income, 
      *1IN IN IN INw s N L Q r b      , being  1   and    the respective weights. 
This compensation is different from the one obtained in urban labor models without an 
informal sector or with a residual informal sector (Wasmer and Zenou,  2002;  Zenou, 2008; 
and Zenou, 2011), where firms only compensate the unemployed worker with a fraction of his 
current income.  This is because, in contrast with the mentioned models, here firms 
acknowledge that an unemployed worker can find a job in an informal sector that offers 
intrinsic benefits. One of these benefits is the urban cost saving for the informal worker, given 
by the difference between the urban cost for a formal worker and the urban cost for an 
informal worker:     *1 IN INs N L Q  . This difference is always positive, reflecting the 
fact that an informal worker commutes less often to the CBD.   
 
The urban cost saving for an informal worker relates, for the first time in the literature, the 
wages in the formal sector (and the job creation rate), both with the degree of centralization 
of the informal sector 
INs ,  and with the sum of both the informal housing production and the 
formal housing production at each x , *Q . The other benefits that make part of the informal 
sector income, and which play a secondary role in the analysis, are the wage
INw , and the 
fraction  INr    of the transfers b .  Finally, it is important to notice that if we had assumed 
that unemployed workers do not commute daily to the CBD, the urban cost for an unemployed 
worker would have been lower than the urban cost of a formal worker. This in turn would 
have created an additional urban cost saving. In previous models like Wasmer and Zenou  
(2002), and Zenou (2011) there is only one urban cost saving, because the informal sector 
does not exist or its spatial features are neglected. Therefore, the kind of informality studied 
here reveals a spatial compensation that has not been previously taken into account. 
 
 
 
1.4.3. Informality and unemployment rates, and the steady-state equilibrium 
 
The structure of the model allows for deriving explicit analytical expressions for the 
informality rate and the unemployment rate. In the steady-state, two conditions must hold: 
first, that the number of unemployed workers that find a formal job,  q U  , equals the 
number of workers that lose their formal jobs, 
F FL , and second, that the number of 
unemployed workers that find an informal job, U , equals the number of informal workers 
that lose their job, 
IN INL .  Therefore, given that F INU N L L   , the following must hold: 
  
   F F F INL q N L L     ,  (1.50) 
  IN IN F INL N L L    ,  (1.51) 
  
which implies that the informality rate *  and unemployment rate *u  in the steady-state are 
given by: 
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It is possible to verify that *( ) 0    ,  *( ) 0u    ,  which shows that an increase in 
formal job creation leads to a decrease in both the informality and the unemployment rates. 
 Given a certain value of the labor market tightness , it is possible to determine all the 
endogenous variables in the model. Replacing (1.49) (the equilibrium wage in the formal 
sector) and (1.52) (the informality rate in the steady-state) into (1.47), we obtain the 
following condition determining the formal job creation rate in equilibrium * :   
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  (1.54) 
 Let   be the expression on the left hand side of (1.54). Assuming that formal sector 
productivity is always higher than the expected income of the unemployed, i.e. assuming that: 
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   (1.55) 
it is always the case that 
0
( ) 0, lim , lim 0
 

 
       . Thus, there must be a unique 
*   that satisfies equation (1.54), and consequently, there is a unique steady-state 
equilibrium. 
 
1.5. Comparative statics  
 
In this section, we investigate the effects of changes in the city's parameters over the job 
creation rate * , the informality rate * , the housing rent  *HR x  and the land rent  
*R x . 
We pay special attention on the parameters that give shape to the structure of the city: 1) the 
level of centralization of the informal sector
INs  in the labor market  2) the commuting cost 
per unit of distance  , 3) the provision of the public infrastructure Z , 4) the added value 
taxes t  charged to formal land developers , and 5) the probability of detection of an informal 
land developer   (see the Appendix A  for formal proofs).  
 
1.5.1. Decrease in the informal sector centralization  
 
Recall that a decrease in the commuting frequency of an informal worker is always followed 
by an increase of the wage fraction generated through home-based work. Spatially, this can be 
seen as a decrease in the informal production at the center and a rise of the informal 
production in the periphery. As a consequence, the effects on the economy of a decrease in 
INs  provide an idea of the effects on the economy of a lower degree of centralization of the 
informal sector.  
When the commuting frequency 
INs  decreases, the commuting cost for an informal worker 
decreases. This causes a reduction of the equilibrium housing rent all over the city and an 
increase in the urban cost saving for the informal worker     *1 IN INs N L Q  . 
Consequently in the labor market, the wage paid by a formal firm increases, the job creation in 
the formal sector decreases, and the informality rate gets increased.  In the land market, the 
increased labor informality makes the formal workers zone smaller. This relaxes the 
competition for housing and causes an additional reduction of the equilibrium housing rent at 
the formal workers zone. Finally, when the housing rent decreases, the value of marginal 
productivity of land decreases (both for the informal developers and the formal developers, at 
any distance x  of the CBD). This is described in Figure 3 as a simultaneous downward shift of 
the  FH x  curve       to   'FH x FH x  and the  IH x  curve       to   'IH x IH x . Because 
these shifts are of the same proportion for both curves, there is a decrease in the equilibrium 
land rent, and no changes in the intersectoral housing production.  The results are synthetized 
in proposition 1. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Effects of decentralization on the urban land market 
Proposition 1  
 
A decrease in the level of centralization of the informal sector 
INs  leads to: a decrease in the job 
creation rate in the formal sector * , an increase in the informality rate * , and a decrease in the 
housing rent  *HR x  and the land rent  
*R x  at each
*0, ( )N Qx    .     
 
1.5.2. Increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance 
 
An increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance   leads to an increase in the total 
commuting cost for all workers, but in a higher proportion for the formal workers, as they 
commute more often to the CBD.   As a consequence, there is a rise in the urban cost saving of 
informal workers     *1 IN INs N L Q  . As in the previous case, this implies that the 
wage paid by a formal firm rises, the job creation in the formal sector decreases, and the 
informality rate increases. These results lead to a key insight: the informality rate can be 
affected by policies targeting intraurban mobility costs.  In the land market, the increase in 
commuting cost directly rises housing rents and land rents in the informal workers zone. In 
the formal workers zone, on the one hand, we have a direct effect that increases the housing 
rent and land rent. On the other hand, there is an indirect effect, leading to a decrease in these 
rents. The indirect effect exists because the formal workers zone gets reduced, relaxing the 
competition for housing. We have that the direct effect dominates near the CBD and the 
indirect effect dominates far from the CBD. 
 
Proposition 2  
 
An increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance   leads to: a decrease in the job creation 
rate in the formal sector * , and an increase in the informality rate * .  Also this variation 
implies that the housing rent  *HR x and land rent  
*R x  both get increased at each 
   * *1 1 ( )0, ( ) INN Q sx            and 
* *(( ) ), ( )INx N L Q N Q    , and 
decrease at each           * **1 ,1 I INNN Q sx N L Q          . 
 
  
1.5.3. Decrease in the provision of the public infrastructure (increase in the tax level 
charged to formal land developers ) 
 
At each distance  *0, N Qx    , a decrease in the provision of infrastructure Z , reduces the 
marginal productivity of land for formal land developers, affecting their land demand given by 
(1.12). This is described in Figure 4 as a downward shift of the  FH x  curve 
      to   'FH x FH x . This leads to a decrease in the land allocation in the formal housing 
sector  *FHl x , and to an increase in the land allocation in the informal housing sector  
*
IHl x , 
whereas leaves the land rent  *R x  unaffected.  Given the increased land allocation in the 
less productive sector, at each distance x   the total housing production *Q  (and the average 
tallness of buildings *q )  decreases.  Because of this, the city has to spread out to 
accommodate all the households. Therefore, the city fringe *
fx  and the frontier 
*
dx   are now 
farther from the CBD. In short, now the city is less tall and also more spread, i.e., it is less 
compact.  As a consequence, the urban costs for all workers increases, but in a higher 
proportion for the formal workers because they commute more often to the CBD. As a result, 
the urban cost saving for the informal workers     *1 IN INs N L Q   rises.  Again this 
leads to a higher wage in the formal sector, to a lower job creation in the formal sector, and to 
a higher informality rate.  Finally, in the informal workers zone, the housing rent and land rent 
rise because the city fringe *
fx  is now farther from the CBD.  In the formal workers zone, on 
the one hand, the housing rent and land rent tend to rise because the higher informal housing, 
and on the other hand, these rents tend to fall because the formal employment falls. As a 
consequence of this, the change in the rents is ambiguous.  
 
Proposition 3  
 
A decrease in the provision of the public infrastructure Z  (an increase in the taxes charged to 
the informal land developers) increases the informal housing all over the city, making the city 
less tall and more spread, i.e., less compact. This in turn leads to:  a decrease in the job creation 
rate in the formal sector * , an increase in the informality rate * , an increase in the housing 
rent  *HR x  and the land rent  
*R x  at each     * *,INx N L Q N Q    , and an 
ambiguous change in these rents at each     *0, INx N L Q    . 
 
Proposition 3 establishes a clear relationship between some of the most important features 
exhibited by cities in developing countries. Remarkably, it shows that a higher level of informal 
housing leads to a larger spatial size of the city, and to a higher level of informality in the labor 
market. It is important to notice that a rise in the level of taxes t , affects the land demand 
conditions in the same way that a decrease in the infrastructure. Thus, it generates exactly the 
same effects described in Proposition 3.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Initial effects of changes in the public infrastructure or the taxes on  the land market 
 
 1.5.4. Effects of changes in  the probability of detection of informal housing 
 
At each distance  *0, N Qx    , a rise in the probability of detection 1  , causes that the 
value of the expected marginal productivity of land in the informal housing sector to fall. 
Then, the  IH x  curve shifts downwards in Figure 5       to   'IH x IH x . It is easy to see 
that this lowers the land rent  *R x  and the land allocated to the informal housing sector
 *IHl x .  As a consequence, the total housing production 
*Q   and the average building height 
*q   increase. Because of this, the city is more compact now. This implies that the city fringe 
*
fx  and the frontier 
*
dx   are now closer to the CBD. As a result,   the urban cost saving for an 
informal worker     *1 IN INs N L Q   falls.  Therefore, the formal wage falls, formal job 
creation increases, and the informality rate decreases.  Finally, in the informal workers zone, 
the housing rents and land rents fall whereas in the formal workers zone, the change in these 
rents is ambiguous.  
 
  
Figure 5. Initial effects of changes in the probability of detection on the land market 
 
Proposition 4 
  
A rise in the probability of detection 1  ,  decreases the informal housing all over the city, 
making the city more compact. This in turn leads to:  a rise in the job creation rate in the formal 
sector * , a decrease in the informality rate * , a decrease in the housing rent  *HR x  and the 
land rent  *R x  at each     * *,INx N L Q N Q    , and an ambiguous change in these 
rents at each     *0, INx N L Q    . 
 
 
 
 
 
1.6. Rural urban migration, informal labor, and informal housing.  
 
Cities in developing countries display not only high levels of labor informality and 
unemployment, but also high rates of urban growth fueled by rural urban migration 
(Brueckner and Lall, 2014). For instance, in Latin America, rural-urban migration explained 
30% of urban growth between 1980 and 2010 (CEPAL, 2012). The seminal work of Harris and 
Todaro (1970) shed light on why rural-urban migration occurs even when cities display large 
unemployment rates. Harris and Todaro’s work highlights the fact that rural workers migrate 
to cities because urban expected incomes are higher. In their model, the equilibrating 
mechanism is the rate of urban unemployment. As the urban population increases the 
unemployment rate also increases. As a result, the expected income in the city decreases, 
reducing the incentives to migrate. Later extensions of Harris and Todaro’s work (Brueckner 
and Zenou 1999; Brueckner and Kim 2001) consider that besides the unemployment rate, the 
increase in urban costs can also act as an equilibrating mechanism.  
 
Despite these theoretical advances, it is still not clear how migration works when workers 
face not only the possibility of being unemployed, but also the possibility of working in a 
decentralized informal sector and living in informal housing. Next, we extend our model to the 
case of an open city where there is rural-urban migration a-là Harris-Todaro. With this 
extension, we aim at studying the relationship between the level of decentralization of the 
informal sector and the level of rural urban migration. We also use this extension to study in a 
detailed way how transport policies can affect labor informality. In particular, we seek to 
compare different policy options in terms of their efficiency. 
 
1.6.1. Set up and calibration 
 
Following Zenou (2011), we now consider a scenario where the non-housing good is 
produced in two regions: an urban and a rural. The total population is denoted by N  and, as 
before, the urban population by N .  The mass of rural workers (which as it will be shown 
below is also the total population in the rural region) is denoted by 
RL .  Therefore, the total 
population is F IN RN L L L U    , the urban population is RN N L  , and the 
unemployment level in the city is given by:   F I RNU N L L L    . The city structure is the 
same as the one described before. In the rural region, the production function is  R RF L  with 
  0R RF L   and   0R RF L  . In equilibrium the rural wage is equal to the marginal product 
of rural labor: 
  R R Rw F L .  (1.56) 
  
As a consequence, there is no rural unemployment. Therefore, the total population in the rural 
region equals the mass of rural workers.  Rural workers do not commute because they live 
close the fields that they cultivate.  As a consequence, the urban cost (the commuting cost plus 
the housing rent) is higher than the rural cost (the rural worker pays the rural rent for the 
land he consumes). The instantaneous utility for a rural worker is given by the difference 
between the rural wage 
Rw  and the rural rent (which is zero).  Therefore, the expected 
lifetime utility of a rural worker is given by:  
0
rt
R Rw e w r

  .   
 
As in the Harris-Todaro model, incentives for rural urban migration exist and workers base 
their migration decision on their expected incomes. Following Zenou (2011), we assume that 
a rural worker cannot search for an urban job from home, but she must first become 
unemployed in the city, and then search for an urban job. As a result, rural urban migration 
guarantees that, in equilibrium, the expected lifetime utility of a rural worker is equal to the 
expected lifetime utility of an unemployed worker. Formally, the migration condition is given 
by:   
 R
U
w
I
r
 .  (1.57) 
As before, the flows in and out unemployment must equalize:  
  
   F F RF INL q N L L L     ,  (1.58) 
  IN I RN F INL N L L L    .  (1.59) 
  
Therefore, the steady-state relationships between urban and rural employment are given by:  
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Because the urban population is precisely equal to RN L  , the informality rate 
*  and 
unemployment rate *u  in the city are still given by (1.52) and (1.53). Using the informality 
rate (1.52), we have that the equilibrium wage in the formal sector is now given by:  
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.    (1.62) 
 
whereas the difference between the expected lifetime utility of the formal worker and the 
expected lifetime utility of the unemployed worker  is given by: 
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   (1.63) 
 
Replacing the new wage (1.62) into (1.47), we obtain the new condition that determines the 
job creation rate as a function of the level of rural employment:   
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By using (1.62), (1.52), (1.56), and replacing  (1.63) and (1.42) in (1.40), the migration 
condition (1.57) can be written as:  
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   (1.65) 
This condition determines the rural employment (the size of both regions) as a function of the 
job creation rate. By using equations (1.64) and (1.65), it is possible to find the equilibrium 
job creation rate *  and the equilibrium rural employment *RL . Thus, equations (1.64) and 
(1.65) characterize the steady-state equilibrium. The model is calibrated in order to 
reproduce relevant stylized facts of Latin American cities. We decided to solve the model in 
this way given that our interest is to study the implications of labor and housing informality 
on rural urban migration in a specific developing world context.   
 
We begin by fixing parameters in the housing industry because the housing production is 
independent of any outcome in the labor market.  We fix the total factor productivity in the 
formal housing sector 
FHA  at 1; whereas the land productivity in the informal housing sector 
IHA  is fixed at 0.5.  The tax rate t  is fixed at 0.3; the infrastructure Z  at 1.3; and the 
probability of detection 1    at 0. The parameter of the formal production function   is 
fixed in 0.5.  Under the specified values, the total housing production at each x   is 0.6479, 
whereas the formal housing production is 0.2275. As a result, the share of formal housing in 
the market is 35%. This is very close to estimated values for Colombia (Minvivienda, Gobierno 
de Colombia, 2010). 
 
Now we focus on the parameters in the urban labor market. The parameter values (with a 
year as the implicit unit of time) are within the range of those used in previous studies 
(Albrecht, et al., 2009; Zenou, 2008; Zenou, 2011; Gómez, 2013; Gómez and Jaramillo, 2013). 
We start by fixing the discount rate r  at 0.05; the unemployed worker current income 
Uw  at 
0; the informal job creation rate   at 1.5; the commuting costs per unit of distance   at 0.01; 
and the total population N  at 10. We then fix the productivity in the formal sector 
Fy  at 1; 
the worker's bargaining power   at 0.5; the job destruction rate 
F  at 0.4.  The tax level T  is 
fixed at 0.3; and the cost of maintaining a vacancy c  at 0.2. In the formal sector, we assume a 
matching function of the following type:   0.5 0.5,Ud S U V U V .   For the informal sector we fix 
both the wage
INw , the amount of transfers (or value of social insurance subsidies) b , the job 
destruction rate 
IN , and the decentralization rate INs  at 0.5.  Finally, in the rural region the 
production function is given by:   0.7R R RF L L .  
 
Under the specified values, the model predicts an unemployment rate of 15.89% and an 
informality rate of 47.67%. This implies that approximately 56% of all employed workers are 
in the informal sector. This value is close to recent estimates for many Latin American cities, 
including Bogotá (57%), Medellín (50%), Lima (57%) and Buenos Aires (45%) (Galvis, 2012; 
CNTPE, 2008; MTEySS, 2007). The model also predicts that the rural population is about the 
23.1% of the total population. Again, this value is close to recent estimates for many Latin 
American counties, including Colombia (24%), Peru (22%) and Brazil (15%) (World Bank, 
2015).   
 
1.6.2. Comparative statics  
 
Now, we investigate the effects of changes in the city's parameters on rural urban migration. 
Again, we pay special attention on the parameters that shape the structure of the city: 1) the 
level of centralization of the informal sector 
INs ; 2) the commuting cost per unit of distance
; 3) and the parameters that determine informal housing production  , andZ t  (see the 
Appendix B for simulation results). 
 
1.6.2.1. Decrease in the informal sector centralization  
 
Figure 6 in the Appendix B shows the results of this analysis. As before, when the commuting 
frequency 
INs  decreases, the job creation decreases. As a consequence, the informality and 
unemployment rate increase, and the probability to obtain a job in the formal sector  q   
decreases. This adverse situation in the urban labor market generates a downward pressure 
on the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed worker UrI . Therefore, recalling that the 
migration condition is given by U RrI w , it is expected a migration flow to the rural area (as 
in a traditional Harris-Todaro setting). However, this is not the case. Surprisingly, more 
individuals are willing to work in the city. This is because when the informal sector becomes 
more decentralized, there is a strong direct effect on the urban land market that reduces the 
urban cost for all workers, leading to a significant increase of UrI .  In more detail, 
reorganizing the left side of (1.65), it is possible to show that UrI  is a weighted average of the 
instantaneous utility levels in equilibrium: 15  
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.  (1.66) 
When the commuting frequency 
INs  decreases, the competition for urban land is relaxed all 
over the city. As a consequence, the urban cost decreases for all workers, leading to an 
increase in their respective instantaneous utility levels. From (1.66) it can be seen that this 
causes an increase in the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed worker UrI . In 
conclusion, a more decentralized informal sector stimulates rural urban migration because, 
even if worsens the urban labor market, gives to the rural workers the advantage to live in a 
city with a lower cost of life (lower urban cost).  
 
There are interesting implications of these results. First, even if the formality rate decreases, 
the level of formal work increases.  Second, the unemployment rate and the informal rate can 
overreact to the increase in decentralization, because now they vary in response to both the 
lower job creation in the formal sector and the higher rural urban migration. Finally, it is 
worth noticing that both the level of formal employment and the level of unemployment 
increase. This suggests the existence of a “Todaro paradox”.16 However this is not the case, 
because both levels increase as a direct consequence of rural urban migration.  
 
 
                                  
15 Recall that in equilibrium the instantaneous utility for a worker is given by de difference between its current 
income and the equilibrium urban cost (see equations  (1.33), (1.34), and  (1.35)). 
16 The Todaro paradox emerges when one extra minimum-wage job could induce more than one urban worker to 
migrate to the rural area, hence increasing the unemployment rate. 
 
1.6.2.2. Increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance 
 
Figure 7 in the Appendix B shows the results of the analysis. As in the closed city case, an 
increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance   leads to a lower job creation in the 
formal sector and to a higher informality rate.  At the same time, the increase in the 
commuting cost increases the competition for urban land all over the city, making the urban 
cost higher for all workers. These adverse situations both in the land market and the labor 
market, lead to a lower level in the expected lifetime utility of the unemployed worker. As a 
consequence, the urban area is now less attractive. Therefore, the rural population increase 
and the urban population decrease.   
 
 
1.6.2.3. Decrease in the provision of the public infrastructure (increase in the tax 
level charged to formal land developers ) 
 
An increase in the taxes charged to formal land developers leads to lower formal housing and 
to lower housing production *Q .  This directly reduces the tallness of buildings and increases 
the spatial size of the city (i.e. pushes outwards the city fringe).17  As a result, the urban cost 
saving for an informal worker rises, leading to a lower job creation, and to a higher 
informality rate (see Figure 8 in the Appendix B for the results).   Because the city is now more 
spread, the competition for urban land increases, making the urban cost higher for all 
workers. Then, the urban area becomes less attractive and the rural population increases. As a 
consequence, there is an indirect pressure that reduces the spatial size of the city. At the end, 
the spatial size of the city effectively increases because this indirect pressure is not too strong.  
Then as before, a higher level of informal housing leads to a larger spatial size of the city and to 
a higher level of informality in the labor market.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
17 The city fringe is given by: 
*
*
R
f
N L
x
Q

 . 
 
1.7. Policy analysis 
 
In a previous analysis we have showed how the differences in commuting costs between 
formal and informal workers impact the urban labor market. In this section, we study in detail 
the ability of transport policies to reduce informality. On the one hand, we want to evaluate, in 
a comparative way, how they can impact welfare and informality levels.  On the other hand, 
we want to identify how these policies should be implemented. To do so, we assume the 
government uses a limited amount of resources in one of three possible policy options: 1) an 
entry cost subsidy for formal firms; 2) a transport subsidy to all workers, and 3) a transport 
subsidy targeted to formal workers only. We assume that the government’s budget is financed 
through a tax T  on formal firms.18 
 
Under the first policy option, the government assumes a fraction c  of the search costs of 
each formal firm, so that after the subsidy, the search cost is equal to  1 c c .  Under the 
second policy option, the government assumes a fraction  of the total commuting costs of 
each worker, so the actual total commuting cost is  1 x   for formal workers and 
 1 INs x   for informal workers. This specification guarantees that, regardless of the 
traveled distance, formal workers face a commuting cost per unit distance equal to  1   , 
whereas informal workers one equal to   1 INs  . Under the third policy option, the 
government gives to each formal worker a fraction 
F  of its total commuting costs, so that 
the actual total commuting cost becomes  1 F x  , while the commuting cost per unit of 
distance is  1 F  .  
 
It is important to clarify that because we assume, first, that taxes are exogenous and fixed, and 
second, that no person receives a larger subsidy than other person, the subsidy has to adjust 
endogenously in order to meet the budget restriction. Lastly, we do not consider a subsidy to 
informal workers only, because generates exactly the same effects of an increase in the level 
                                  
18 We simplify the analysis by assuming that housing production is exogenous and equal to 1 in all distances x with 
respect to the CBD. 
of decentralization of the informal sector, and consequently results in an increase in the 
informality rate.  
 
1.7.1. Policies under a budget restriction 
 
Given that in equilibrium the number of vacancies is equal to   * * * RV u N L  , we have 
that under the search cost subsidy, the government’s budget restriction is 
 * *cF RTL c u N L   . This implies that the subsidy is endogenous and equal to:  
 
 
 * *
c F
R
TL
c u N L




. (1.67) 
 
Because we assume that 0 1c  , * *
FTL c u N  must hold. Equation(1.67) shows that the 
subsidy diminishes with an increase either in formal job creation, unemployment, the urban 
population or search-costs. The conditions that describe the equilibrium under this policy 
(and the conditions under the subsequent policy options) can be found in the Appendix C.  
Under a transport subsidy for all workers, the government’s budget restriction is:  
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which is equivalent to:     2 * *20.5 1 1 2F R INTL N L S          . This implies that 
the subsidy is given by:  
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.  (1.68) 
 
 Again, because we are assuming that 0 1  ,  
    2 * *22 1 1 2F R INTL N L S          must hold. From (1.68), it can be seen that 
when the informality rate increases, the subsidy must increase in order to meet the budget 
restriction. This happens because more informal workers are receiving the subsidy, and each 
of them faces lower commuting costs per unit of distance. Lastly, under a transport subsidy 
for formal workers only, the budget restriction is: 
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 or    
22 *0.5 1FF RTL N L
     . Then, the subsidy is given by:  
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In this case, assuming that 0 1F  ,    
22 *2 1F RTL N L     must hold. Because the 
subsidy is given to formal workers only, 1 F INs
   is the condition that guarantees the 
spatial equilibrium described in Figure 1. From (1.69) it can be seen that if the informality 
rate increases, the subsidy increases as well. This is because less formal workers receive the 
subsidy with same amount of public resources. 
  
1.7.2. Comparative performance of transport policies  
 
In order to evaluate and compare different policy options, we will use the change in the 
informality rate and the change in total welfare. Welfare is measured as the sum of the rural 
and urban output levels  W  (Sato, 2004; Zenou, 2009; Zenou, 2011):  
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   (1.70) 
 
This expression is the sum of formal sector output, informal sector output, agricultural (rural) 
output, unemployment benefits, and government transfers to informal workers minus the 
costs of maintaining vacancies, commuting costs of formal workers and commuting costs of 
informal workers. Because wages, land and housing rents are pure transfers, they are not 
included in the calculation of welfare.  
 
Table 1 shows the results. The first thing to note is that the search cost subsidy is the most 
efficient policy, because it achieves the largest level of welfare (163.38), the lowest 
unemployment rate (8.5), and the lowest informality rate (25.50). This happens for two 
reasons. On the one hand, the subsidy stimulates formal employment creation, both indirectly 
(reducing the formal wage) and directly (see equation (1.47)).  All other policies only 
stimulate formal employment creation through a reduction in the formal wage.  
 
 
 
Position  *  
*  *u  
*
FL  
*
INL  
*U  
*
RL  
*W  
 Base equilibrium 0.88 47.19 15.73 2.96 3.77 1.25 1.99 145.69 
1 Search cost subsidy 9.64 25.50 8.50 5.59 2.16 0.72 1.52 163.38 
3 Transport subsidy (all) 1.20 44.47 14.82 3.69 4.03 1.34 0.92 149.27 
2 Transport subsidy (formal) 2.76 36.78 12.26 4.68 3.38 1.12 0.80 156.04 
 
Table 1.  Policy efficiency comparison 
On the other hand, the search cost subsidy leads the economy to a level of rural-urban 
migration (and to a level of urban labor supply) that generates the lower saturation in the 
urban labor market. As a matter of fact, this policy generates the most significant reduction in 
both the informality and unemployment levels. This is because the entry cost subsidy induces 
rural-urban migration only through the improvement in the labor market, without directly 
affecting the land market and the urban costs. On the contrary, the transport subsidy to all 
workers significantly decreases the urban costs, inducing large rural-urban migration flows.  
As a result the informality and unemployment levels increase.  This result is similar to the 
“Todaro paradox”.  
 
The second thing to note is that the transport subsidy targeted to formal workers only 
outperforms the transport subsidy to all workers. Both subsidies directly affect the urban land 
market, leading to a large rural-urban migration. However, the targeted subsidy directly 
reduces the difference that originates the spatial compensation considered in the formal wage
 1 INs . Because of this, the effect of this subsidy on the labor market is strong enough to 
absorb the new migrants. In fact, under this subsidy, the levels of unemployment and 
informality decrease. In contrast, as note before, the transport subsidy to all workers does not 
reduce the informality and unemployment levels.  
 
1.7.3. Sensitivity analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we compare the policies for different 
parameter values. The considered parameters are: the commuting costs per unit of distance, 
the search costs, the bargaining power and the level of decentralization.  As can be seen in 
Figure 9, Figure 10, Figure 11 and Figure 12 in the Appendix D, the search cost subsidy 
generates the largest welfare value and the lowest informality rate regardless of the value 
these parameters take. Furthermore, the conclusion that the transport subsidy for formal 
workers only, is superior to the transport subsidy for all workers also holds for a wide range 
of parameter values.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.8. Conclusions  
 
Most of the existing literature analyzing the causes of urban labor informality has focused on 
institutional reasons. Another important set of determinants, which has not been yet 
extensively explored in the literature, comes from the characteristic of cities in which informal 
workers reside. In order to investigate the impact of city structure in urban labor informality, 
this paper builds a monocentric city model with a labor market characterized by search 
frictions and the presence of an informal sector. To focus in the particular structure of the 
Latin American cities, we assume that: (1) formal workers commute on a daily basis to the city 
center where formal economic activity is centralized, whereas informal workers commute 
less often, live in the periphery and undertake some of their productive activities at home 
(informal jobs are in part decentralized), and (2) there is presence of informal housing.  
 
The results show that in order to  induce workers to accept a job in the formal sector, formal 
firms must compensate them with the expected income obtained outside the formal sector. 
This expected income is a weighted sum of the income obtained as an unemployed (e.g. 
unemployment insurance) and the income obtained as an informal worker.  Part of this 
income is the commuting cost saving obtained by the informal worker by commuting less 
often to the city center. We demonstrate how higher informal job decentralization, a higher 
commuting cost, and a higher proportion of informal housing (as a result of lower 
infrastructure provision, or a lower probability of detection) all result in a higher informality 
rate. This is because all these situations increase the benefits of not commuting frequently to 
the CBD, and consequently increase the spatial compensation that formal firms have to offer 
as part of the formal wage.  
 
We extend our model for the case of an open city with rural-urban migration a-là Harris-
Todaro. This extension allows us to capture simultaneously urban labor, land and housing 
market interactions, and at the same time, it allows us to determine their impact on rural-
urban migration. In the model, both the unemployment rate and urban costs act as an 
equilibrating force. We find, as before, that higher informal job decentralization leads to a 
higher informality rate. This should lead to lower rural-urban migration. Surprisingly, the 
opposite holds:  rural-urban migration actually increases. This happens because a more 
decentralized informal sector relaxes the competition for land near the CBD, reducing in this 
way the urban costs for all workers and effectively increasing the urban expected income.  
 Finally, we use the extended model to compare the impact of search costs and transport 
policies on labor informality and welfare. The results show that an entry-cost subsidy has a 
higher impact on the informality rate than transport policies. This happens for two reasons. 
First, an entry-cost subsidy stimulates formal employment creation directly and indirectly 
(through a reduction in wages), while transport policies only affect formal employment 
creation indirectly. Second, the entry-cost subsidy affects rural-urban migration only through 
its effect on formal employment creation, while transport subsidies have an additional effect 
reducing urban costs, which ultimately lead to higher rural-urban migration and a higher 
saturation of the labor market.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.9. Appendix A 
 
Proof of proposition 1 
 
Consider a decrease in the level of centralization of the informal sector 
INs . First, totally 
differentiating equation (1.54) we have that:      * IN INs s         . Because 
  0   , the sign of  * INs     is the opposite of  INs  . Using (1.54) it is easy to 
show that   0INs   , and therefore the  job creation rate 
* decreases with a decrease in 
the commuting frequency.  Additionally we have that:     * * * *IN INs s          , 
and because  * * 0    , the sign of   * INs     is the same of  INs  . Thus, the 
informality rate * increases with a decrease in the commuting frequency.  We use (1.36) to 
see the effects over the housing rents.  In the informal workers zone we have: 
    * * 0H INR x s N Q x     , whereas in the formal workers zone we have: 
        * * * * *1 0H IN IN INR x s N Q s s N Q            , which means that 
housing rents decrease all over the city with a decrease in the commuting frequency. Because 
the land rents are the housing rents times 
IHA , land rents also decrease with the commuting 
frequency. 
 
Proof of proposition 2 
 
Consider an increase in the commuting cost per unit of distance . Proceeding as before, we 
need to find the sign of      to know how *  and *  change. Using (1.54), it can be 
shown that   0   , and therefore the  job creation rate * decreases and  the 
informality rate * increases with an increase in the commuting cost.  We use (1.36) to see the 
effects over the housing rents.  In the informal workers zone we have: 
     * * 0H INR x s N Q x     , whereas in the formal workers zone we have: 
           * * * * *1H INR x N Q x s N Q             . This implies that the 
housing rent  *HR x  and land rent  
*R x  increase at each 
       * *10 1, INN Qx s            and     
* *,INx N L Q N Q    , and 
decrease at each           * **1 ,1 I INNN Q sx N L Q          . 
 
Proof of proposition 3 
 
Consider a decrease in the provision of the public infrastructure Z . Using (1.54) it can be 
shown that   0Z   , and therefore the  job creation rate * decreases and  the 
informality rate * increases with a decrease in the provision of the public infrastructure.  In 
the informal workers zone we have that the land rents and housing rents increase.  This is 
because it always holds that:       * * * *H HR x Z R x Q Q Z       , with  
  * * 0HR x Q    and  * 0Q Z   . In the formal workers zone we have that: 
               2* * * * * * * *1 1 1 1H INR x Z N Q Q Z s Q Z Q Z                 
, which implies  that the housing rent  *HR x and land rent  
*R x  have an ambiguous change.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.10. Appendix  B 
 
 
Figure 6. Effects of a higher decentralization  of the informal sector 
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 Figure 7. Effects of a rise in the commuting cost 
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 Figure 8. Effects of a decrease in the provision of public infrastructure (or an increase in the tax level 
charged to formal land developers) 
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1.11. Appendix C 
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where c    is given by (1.67).  
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where   is given  by (1.68). 
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where F   is given by  (1.69).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1.12. Appendix D 
 
 
Figure 9. Informality rate vs. Commuting costs, and Total welfare vs. Commuting costs 
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Figure 10. Informality rate vs. Entry costs, and  Total welfare vs. Entry costs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
c
I
n
f
o
r
m
a
li
t
y
 
r
a
t
e
 
 
inf
inf-c
inf-tau
inf-tauf
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
120
130
140
150
160
170
180
c
T
o
t
a
l 
w
e
lf
a
r
e
 
 
W
W-c
W-tau
W-tauf
  
Figure 11. Informality rate vs. Bargaining power, and Total welfare vs. Bargaining power 
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 Figure 12. Informality rate vs. Decentralization, and Total welfare vs. Decentralization 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
0.25
0.3
0.35
0.4
0.45
0.5
sin
In
fo
rm
a
li
ty
 r
a
te
 
 
inf
inf-c
inf-tau
inf-tauf
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
140
145
150
155
160
165
170
sin
T
o
ta
l 
w
e
lf
a
re
 
 
W
W-c
W-tau
W-tauf
Chapter two 
On the Effect of Transport Subsidies on 
Informality Rates19 
 
2.1. Introduction 
 
Cities in developing and emerging economies display a strong core-periphery split, with lower 
income groups located in peripheral areas of the city with restricted access to job 
opportunities, services, transport facilities and amenities (Rode, et al., 2009). In these cities, a 
large segment of the lower-income population has to bear not only longer commuting 
distances, but also longer commuting times for the same distance traveled. In Bogotá, for 
instance, the poor bear average commuting times up to half an hour longer per trip, and spend 
more than 20% of their income on transport, whereas the richest spend only 5%. 
Consequently, the poorest make less than 1.5 trips per day, almost half than the richest 
(Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2012). As a result of commuting differences, workers may opt for 
carrying out productive informal activities within or near home. According to recent 
estimates, informal employment accounts for more than half of non-agricultural employment 
in most developing regions of the world (Vanek, et al., 2014). Informality has a negative 
consequences not only in terms of productivity and incomes, but also in terms of the budget 
burden in countries where a large proportion of the population does not contribute to the 
health care and pension systems. The existence and persistence of an informal sector has been 
attributed mostly to institutional factors (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010; Perry, et al., 2007). 
Little is known, however, about the relationship between accessibility and informality, and 
whether transport policies can have an impact on informality rates. 
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627114). Posada acknowledges financial support of Universidad de Antioquia, Colciencias and Conalpe. 
 
In order to investigate how accessibility affects informality, we build a spatial search model. In 
the model there are three possible labor market statuses (formally employed, informally 
employed and unemployed); a formal sector where the hiring process is subject to search 
frictions which result in unemployment; and an informal sector where all workers are self-
employed and have lower productivity than formal workers. Workers are distributed on a 
linear city with a unique Central Business District (CBD). Formal and unemployed workers 
commute every day to the CBD, where all formal activity is centralized. Instead of imposing 
commuting differences, we allow informal workers to endogenously choose their commuting 
frequency knowing that there are two informal sub-sectors: a CBD-based one, offering a 
certain remuneration, and a home-based one, offering a lower remuneration. A segmented 
city emerges in equilibrium, with formal workers residing in the CBD, and informal workers 
residing in the periphery. In order to attract workers, formal firms have to offer compensation 
for the lower commuting costs and social protection transfers workers would get if they were 
informally employed. We show that transport infrastructure investment have the capacity to 
reduce the informality rate, because lower commuting costs allow formal workers to offer a 
smaller spatial compensation to potential workers. 
 
We use the model to compare the impact and efficiency of four policy options to reduce 
informality: a subsidy on formal firms hiring-costs, a transport subsidy for either all workers, 
formal workers only, or informal workers only. We focus our attention on the effects of the 
later, because to date, the effect of a subsidy targeted exclusively to informal workers has not 
been analyzed theoretically or empirically. Although these type of subsidies are not common, 
they have been implemented. An example is the recent transport subsidy program 
implemented Bogotá. The subsidy covering 40% of the cost of mass public transport is 
targeted exclusively to low-income beneficiaries of the subsidized social protection program 
(who are mostly informal workers). We find that a subsidy targeted exclusively to informal 
workers has no effect on the informality rate and slightly decreases welfare. The reason is that 
the subsidy affects the spatial compensation formal firms have to pay, and consequently 
results in lower job creation in the formal sector. Instead, a subsidy targeted to all workers, 
such as a general subsidy on the mass transport system flat-rate, does bring a reduction in the 
informality rate. However, we find that a hiring-costs subsidy implemented through, for 
instance, centralized employment agencies, is superior to transport subsidies in reducing 
informality. The results are robust to relaxing the assumption that unemployed workers 
commute daily to the CBD. 
 
Our paper is connected to a large body of literature analyzing the reasons behind the 
existence and persistence of an urban informal sector in developing and emerging economies 
(Camacho, et al., 2013; Ferreira and Robalino, 2010; Jütting, et al., 2008). Whereas recent 
contributions highlight the need to consider the heterogeneity of informal activities and the 
different motivations for choosing informality from the worker perspective (Günther and 
Launov, 2012; Maloney, 2004), the location decisions of informal workers are disregarded. In 
this paper we translate the heterogeneity of the urban informal sector into its spatial 
expression by considering the existence of two informal sub-sectors within an urban area. 
After considering a heterogeneous informal sector which offers intrinsic benefits, we show 
that location decisions have a non-trivial effects on informality rates, through their effect of 
commuting and housing costs. 
 
Our paper is also connected to the Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis (SMH) literature. According 
to the SMH, the adverse labor outcomes of minorities are the result of the spatial 
disconnection between low-skilled jobs and the places where minorities reside (Kain, 1968). 
This hypothesis was inspired in the case of metropolitan areas of the US which, due to 
innovations in transportation, experienced increased residential suburbanization in the 
second half of the 20th century. At the same time, there was a process of dispersion of firms 
away from central areas within cities. Minorities allegedly relocated at a slower pace than jobs 
because they faced discrimination in the housing market or were subject to zoning 
regulations, leading to a concentration of minorities in inner-city areas where low-skilled job 
creation was slow (Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist , 1998). In this literature, there is consensus on the 
view that distance to jobs is partly responsible for the unfavorable labor market outcomes of 
minorities (Selod, et al., 2007; Ihlanfeldt and Sjoquist , 1998). Our paper contributes to this 
literature by considering the case of urban areas in emerging and developing economies 
which display a different spatial pattern than US cities. Furthermore, it also considers the fact 
that, unlike the case of personal attributes such as race, informality is not a fixed attribute but 
a choice that offers intrinsic benefits (Albrecht, et al., 2009; Maloney, 2004). 
 
Our model integrates two existing extensions of the standard search and matching 
framework: the inclusion of an informal sector and the integration of an urban land-use 
market. Regarding the first extension, unlike existing works (Zenou, 2011; Zenou, 2008), we 
do not consider the informal sector to be a residual sector or a buffer where rural-urban 
migrants queue for formal jobs. In fact, we do not consider the effects of rural-urban 
migration at all, as we have in mind the case of consolidated urban areas. In our model, the 
informal sector is a micro-entrepreneurial unregulated sector that offers intrinsic benefits, 
such as health-care subsidies, so that being informal is, to some extent, a matter of choice 
(Albrecht, et al., 2009; Maloney, 2004). Regarding the second extension, previous works 
incorporate a spatial compensation paid by formal firms resulting from assumed commuting 
differences between unemployed and employed workers (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002; Smith 
and Zenou, 1995). In our framework, we consider instead commuting differences between 
formal and informal workers. Our contributions to existing theoretical models lie in making 
the commuting choices of informal workers endogenous. The article is structured as follows. 
Section 2 presents the model set up and shows the effect of changes in city structure and 
informal income sources on the informality rate. Section 3 compares the impact of the 
proposed policies. Section 4 discusses and concludes. 
 
2.2. The Model 
  
2.2.1. The city 
 
 The total urban population is equal to = F INN L L U  , where U  is the unemployment 
level and FL  and INL  are formal and informal employment levels. Unemployed workers can 
obtain either a formal or an informal job, but only actively search for formal jobs. In the 
reminder of the article we refer to the group of formal and unemployed workers FL U  as 
"formal workers". All workers live in a linear and closed city, with a unique Central Business 
District (CBD). We assume the density of residential land parcels to be unity, so that there are 
exactly x  residential units within a distance x  from the CBD. Workers optimally decide to 
reside at any point between the CBD ( = 0)x  and the city fringe ( = )x N . The commuting cost 
function is given by:  
 
   = ,T x T x   (2.1) 
 
which implies that commuters face a fixed cost T  plus a variable cost x , where   is the 
commuting cost per unit of distance. T  can be interpreted as a flat-rate charged for accessing 
the mass transport system, and x  as the leisure value lost in commuting. We choose this 
specification because our objective is to show the effect of a subsidy on a flat-rate charge 
rather than a subsidy on either all the units of distance traveled (e.g., a subsidy on gasoline 
consumption), or the first unit of distance traveled (Zenou, 2011). 
 
2.2.2. Urban formal sector 
 
 Each formal firm is a productive unit that hires a single (previously unemployed) worker. We 
assume that all formal firms locate at the CBD. The hiring process is subject to search frictions, 
as defined in the standard search-matching framework (Pissarides, 2000). Firms fill a vacancy 
and unemployed workers find employment, following a random Poisson process. In the 
aggregate, the number of contacts per unit of time between the worker and the firm sides of 
the market is determined by the following matching function with exhibit Constant Returns to 
Scale:  
  = , ,Ud d S U V   (2.2) 
 where V  is the total number of vacancies and 
U
S  is the average search efficiency of 
unemployed workers. M  is the total mass of firms, v  is the vacancy rate and u  is the 
unemployment rate. The total number of unemployed is =U uN , and the total number of 
vacancies is =V vM . The rate at which vacancies are filled can be expressed as 
   ,Ud S U V V q  , where:  
 =
U
V
S U
   (2.3) 
 
 is the labor market tightness in efficiency units. The rate at which an unemployed worker 
with search efficiency 
U
S  leaves unemployment is    ,U U U US d S U V S U S q  . As can be 
verified,  q   and  q   satisfy the standard properties: 1)   < 0'q   ; 2)   0
'
q     , 
and 3)    
0
lim = lim = 0q q
 
  
 
 and    
0
lim = lim =q q
 
  
 
 , indicating, on the one 
hand, that whenever the number of unemployed workers is infinite, firms fill their vacancies 
instantaneously, and, on the other hand, that whenever the number of vacancies is infinite, 
unemployed workers find jobs instantaneously. When firms and unemployed workers meet, a 
wage rate 
F
w  is negotiated, and quantity 
F
y  is produced. 
 
2.2.3. Urban informal sector 
 
The informal sector is composed of two informal sub-sectors: a fully agglomerated one at the 
CBD offering a remuneration cw , and a home-based one offering a remuneration hw . We 
assume that informal workers can generate more income at the CBD than at home, so that 
>c hw w . This could be the case if, for instance, there are positive net agglomeration 
economies accruing informal activities located at the CBD. Note that while formal activity is 
fully centralized at the CBD, informal activity is decentralized. The level of decentralization 
increases with the attractiveness of home-based productive activities with respect to CBD-
based productive activities. Employment opportunities in the urban informal sector are 
created and destroyed following a random Poisson process with creation and destruction 
exogenous rates denoted by   and 
IN
 , respectively. The informal remunerations cw  and hw  
are assumed to be fixed and identical for all workers. Additionally the remuneration for the 
CBD-based subsector, cw , is assumed to be lower than the productivity in the formal sector, 
>
F cy w . We assume that informal workers spend all their available time in informal 
productive activities and consequently do not actively seek formal jobs (i.e., there is not on-
the-job search). 
 
Besides the wage, and contrary to the situation in the formal sector, we assume that informal 
workers receive a transfer once at the beginning of their work period of a positive fixed 
amount b . This fixed quantity can be interpreted as the present value of the sum of all the 
"gifts" received while informally employed that would have otherwise been paid had the 
worker been formally employed. We aim to capture the situation of countries such as 
Colombia and Brazil, where subsidized social protection (including pension and health 
insurance) is offered exclusively for the low income population (Perry, et al., 2007; Maloney, 
2004).20 In order to ensure that the difference in social protection costs is only captured in the 
fixed term b , we assume that all the contributions made by formal workers are recovered 
through access to services (e.g. health-care, insurance, etc.), while informal workers do not 
contribute to the system but can access these services for free, as needed. 
 
2.2.4. Households 
 
 Formal workers are assumed to commute every day to work, so their trip frequency 
F
S  takes 
the value of one (from a possible range between zero and one). Unemployed workers are 
assumed to have a trip frequency equal to their search efficiency 
U
S . Given that 
U
S  is a 
constant, it follows that the average search efficiency 
U
S  is also a constant. Because our 
interest lies on analyzing informal employment and not unemployment, for the sake of 
simplicity we assume that the unemployed commute daily to the CBD in search of work 
opportunities, so that =1
U
S . This assumption is not crucial to our analysis. In section 2.4.4 
we show that our results hold also when we assume a lower commuting frequency for the 
unemployed.21 Formal workers residing at a distance x  from the CBD receive a wage 
F
w , pay 
a rent of ( )R x , consume 
F
z  units of a non-spatial composite good (produced both by formal 
and informal firms), consume one unit of land, and bear a commuting cost of  FS T x . 
Unemployed workers, in turn, receive a fixed income 
U
w  (derived from an unemployment 
subsidy, rent income or own savings), pay a rent ( )R x , consume 
U
z  units of the composite 
good, consume one unit of land, and bear a commuting cost of  US T x . After setting the 
composite non-spatial good as the numéraire, the budget constraint of each formal worker in 
the city can be expressed as:  
 
                                  
20 In such dual systems, formal workers bear (a part of) their social protection costs, while informal workers do not 
bear such costs and are effectively subsidized by the government. 
21 To clarify the difference between unemployment and informal employment some additional remarks are in 
place. First, unemployment in the model is frictional, and can be considered a transitioning state between two 
different job statuses. It is, therefore, not related to cyclical unemployment. Second, in developing countries, people 
are often classified as "informal" even if they work on a family business for a small number of hours a week. The 
unemployed are usually classified as such if they are actively searching for jobs. Third, unemployment benefits, 
common in some European countries, are not common in emerging and developing economies, whereas social 
protection subsidies are. 
     = ,i i iR x S T x z w     (2.4) 
 
for =i F  and U . Assuming individuals are risk neutral, the utility function of each type of 
worker,   =i iz z , combined with the budget constraint given by (2.4), implies that the 
instantaneous indirect utility function is given by:  
 
      = .i i iW x w S T x R x     (2.5) 
 
Once the worker becomes informal, she can optimally choose the commuting frequency 
IN
S  
knowing that the remunerations at the CBD and home-based informal sectors are cw  and hw . 
It should be clear that commuting costs and the share of income generated at CBD increase 
with 
IN
S , whereas the share of income generated at home decreases with 
IN
S . Then, the 
instantaneous indirect utility level at x  for an informal worker is given by:  
 
        2= 1 .IN IN IN INc hW x S w S w S T x R x       (2.6) 
 
Note that total commuting costs increase at a growing rate with 
IN
S . This reflects the 
increasing rate at which the commuter effort has to grow in order to ensure a rise in 
IN
S . 
Informal workers choose 
IN
S  to maximize the instantaneous utility given by (2.6). The first 
order condition to this problem is:  
 
  = 2 ,INc hw w S T x    (2.7) 
 
and the optimal commuting frequency is given by:  
 
 
 
* = .
2
IN
c hw wS
T x


  (2.8) 
 
By commuting more frequently to the CBD, informal workers obtain a gain equal to the 
remuneration differential  c hw w , but also face commuting costs that increase at a rate 
 2 INS T x . Informal workers stop commuting when these two quantities are equal. Note 
that the commuting frequency of informal workers decreases with distance: as informal 
workers move away from the CBD, the growth in their commuting costs exceeds their 
remuneration differential, so they optimally reduce their commuting frequency. Using the 
same reasoning, it can be shown that the commuting frequency, as well the level of 
centralization of the informal sector, decrease with: the informal home-based remuneration 
 hw , the fixed part of the commuting cost  T , and the commuting cost per unit of distance 
  ; and increase with the informal CBD remuneration  cw . We replace (2.8) in (2.6) to 
obtain the instantaneous utility for informal workers:  
 
  
 
 
 
2
= .
4
IN
c h
h
w w
W x w R x
T x

 

  (2.9) 
 
It is worth noticing that the expression     2 4c hw w T x   represents the net profits of 
commuting to the CBD. It also represents (in negative) the commuting costs for informal 
workers, which decrease with distance as a consequence of optimal reductions in the 
commuting frequency. For formal workers, on the other hand, commuting costs always 
increase with distance. 
 
2.3.  Urban land use in equilibrium 
 
We start by making a number of assumptions to simplify the analysis. In the city there is no 
vacant land, and land areas not used for residential purposes are used for agricultural 
production. Agricultural rents, denoted by AR , are exogenous and equal to zero. The urban 
land market is competitive, so that all urban residents take  R x  as given. Workers do not 
bear relocation costs, which are identical within each worker category. Land is owned by 
absentee landlords who earn land rents that are spent outside the city. Thus, in equilibrium, 
each category of worker -formal, informal and unemployed- reaches the same level of 
instantaneous utility, denoted by 
F
W , 
IN
W  and 
U
W , respectively. The corresponding bid rents 
for each worker category are given by:  
 
  , = ,F F F Fx W w T x W      (2.10) 
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  

  (2.11) 
  
  , = ,U U U Ux W w T x W      (2.12) 
 
which indicate the maximum land rent that a worker of category i  is willing to pay in order to 
reach a utility level iW . It is possible to verify that the bid rents for formal and unemployed 
workers are linear, decreasing in x , and share the same level of inclination. The bid rents and 
urban costs for informal workers also decrease with distance. The explanation is as follows. 
When informal workers move away from the CBD, they enjoy lower commuting cost. 
However, at the same time, they lose productivity at a rate given by the wage difference 
between subsectors. Because the productivity losses are greater than the commuting costs 
savings, the bid rent has to decrease with distance. Given that commuting costs and the bid 
rent for informal workers decrease with distance, their urban costs also decrease. In order to 
guarantee that, all over the city, the bid rents for formal and unemployed workers are steeper 
than the bid rents for informal workers, we assume that fixed commuting costs are high 
compared with the benefits of commuting to the CBD for informal workers, so that 
  > 2c hT w w . We are now ready to define the equilibrium land use conditions (Zenou, 
2009): an urban land use equilibrium, with fixed land consumption, no relocation costs, 
endogenous 
IN
S  and formal, informal and unemployed workers is a n-tuple 
  ** * *, , ,F U INW W W R x  such that:  
 
* * = ,
F U F U
W W w w    (2.13) 
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         * * * *= , , , , , ,0 (0, ].F F U U IN INR x max x W x W x W for each x x      (2.16) 
  
Equation (2.13) states that the difference in utility levels of formal workers and the 
unemployed is equal to the difference between the level of income (and independent of the 
commuting distance to the CBD). The bid rents of these groups of workers are consequently 
identical across the city. Equation (2.14) implies that, exactly at the frontier that delimits the 
area where formal and unemployed workers reside ( )
IN
N L , the bid rents of formal and 
informal workers are the same. Equation (2.15), in turn, means that exactly at the fringe of the 
city, bid rents for informal workers are equal to agricultural rents (which are assumed to be 
zero). Finally, Equation (2.16) states that the equilibrium land rent is equal to the upper 
envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of all workers and the agricultural rent line 
(Zenou, 2011). We obtain the equilibrium values of the instantaneous utilities of formal, 
unemployed and informal workers using equations (2.13) to (2.15), so that:  
 
 
 
 
2
* = ,
4
IN h
c hw w
W w
T N



  (2.17) 
  
  
 
 
2
1 1* = ,
4
U U IN
IN
c hw w
W w T N L
T N L T N

 
 
     
   
  (2.18) 
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By replacing (2.17), (2.18) and (2.19)  in (2.11), (2.10) and (2.12), we can obtain the urban 
land rents in equilibrium  *R x :  
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   (2.20) 
 
Figure 13 shows that a segmented city emerges in equilibrium, where formal workers and the 
unemployed reside in the area  0, INN L , and informal workers reside in the area 
 ,INN L N . 
 
 
 
 
Figure 13.  Urban land use equilibrium (the segregated city) 
 2.4. Urban labor market equilibrium 
 
2.4.1. Lifetime expected utility for workers and firms 
 
The model assumes that workers live indefinitely, have rational expectations and discount 
future values at a rate r . Let 
F
I , 
U
I  and 
IN
I  be, in turn, the expected utility of a formal worker, 
an unemployed and an informal worker. In the steady-state, the Bellman equations 
determining 
F
I  and 
IN
I  are given by:  
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  (2.21) 
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which shows that workers obtain their instant utility in each period. Furthermore, formal 
workers can lose their jobs at a rate 
F
 , which leads to a surplus loss of 
F U
I I . Informal 
workers, in turn, can lose their jobs at a rate 
IN
 , so their change in surplus is given by  
U IN
I I .  In the steady-state, the Bellman equation for 
U
I  is given by:  
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  (2.23) 
 
Equation (2.23) shows that, besides obtaining their instant utility, unemployed workers can 
obtain either a formal sector job at a rate  q   (since =1US ), with an accompanying 
increase in surplus of 
F U
I I , or an informal job at a rate  , with a surplus change of 
IN U
I b I   (recall that b  is the present value of the sum of all the transfers received while 
informally employed). Assuming no relocation costs, in equilibrium formal, unemployed and 
informal workers reach the same expected utility levels (
F
I , 
U
I  and 
IN
I ) regardless of their 
intra-urban location. Using (2.22) and (2.23) we obtain:  
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  (2.24) 
 
whereas using (2.21) and (2.23) leads to:  
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Then, replacing (2.24) in (2.25) we obtain:  
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where        =1 F IN INr r q r               and  = INr     . Hiring costs 
per unit of time for formal firms are given by c . It is important to clarify that these costs refer 
to costs incurred while a vacancy is open (those related to providing job information, 
publicity, etc.), and not those costs incurred once a match is made. Then, the value of a 
vacancy 
V
I  and a filled vacancy 
O
I  are given by:  
 
   =V O VrI c q I I     (2.27) 
 
  = .O F F F O VrI y w I I     (2.28) 
 
Firms are free to post vacancies and they do so until = 0
V
I , which, together with (2.27) 
implies:  
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Using = 0
V
I , (2.29) and (2.28) we have the following equation determining job creation in 
the formal sector:  
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2.4.2. Wages and informality and unemployment rates in equilibrium 
 
Each period wages are obtained through a generalized Nash-bargaining process between 
firms and workers, so that: 
    
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= ,
F F U O V
F
w
w argmax I I I I
 
    (2.31) 
 
where 0 1   represents the bargaining power of workers. By solving (2.31) we obtain: 
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   (2.32) 
 
This expression is key to understanding the model proposed here. The first part of (2.32) is 
the compensation that formal firms have to pay in order to induce workers to accept a job in 
the formal sector. This compensation is a fraction  1   of the expected income of an 
unemployed worker, which is a weighted average of current income 
U
w  and informal sector 
income          2 4 1h IN IN INc hw T N L w w T N L r b             , where  1   
and   are the respective weights. Current income in the informal sector is given by the sum 
of: the home-based remuneration 
h
w , the fraction  INr   of the transfers (gifts) b  received 
and a spatial compensation composed of net profits of commuting to the CBD 
    2 4 1c hw w T N     and the urban costs savings (commuting costs plus rents that 
would have been faced as a formal worker), 
           2 4 1 1IN INc hT N L w w T N L T N            . These savings are a 
direct consequence of the possibility that informal workers have of working at home and 
optimally choosing their commuting frequency. 
 
It is worth noting that, contrary to models that assume that the unemployed commute less 
than employed workers (Wasmer and Zenou, 2002; Smith and Zenou, 1995), our wage 
equation does not contain a direct spatial compensation paid to unemployed workers. Instead, 
formal firms have to compensate the unemployed worker with part of the expected informal 
sector income, which includes spatial costs savings. These savings do not depend on assumed 
commuting differences between different types of workers, but on the optimal commuting 
decision of informal workers that face the possibility of carrying their informal work either at 
the CBD or at home. We elaborate more on this result in section 2.4.4.  Let us now consider 
formal and informal employment and unemployment in equilibrium. In the steady-state, two 
conditions must hold: first, that the number of unemployed workers that finds a formal job, 
 q U  , is equal to the number of workers that lose their formal jobs, F FL , and second, 
that the number of unemployed workers that find an informal job, U , is equal to the 
number of informal workers that lose their job, 
IN IN
L . Considering that =
F IN
U N L L  , the 
following must hold:  
 
   = ,F F F INL q N L L       (2.33) 
  
  = ,IN IN F INL N L L      (2.34) 
 which implies that the informality rate *  and unemployment rate *u  in the steady-state are 
given by:  
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It is possible to verify that  * < 0   ,  * < 0u   , which shows that an increase in 
formal job creation leads to a decrease in both the informality and the unemployment rates. It 
can also be shown that 
* *lim = lim = 0u
 

 
, so that informality and unemployment 
disappear as formal sector employment creation reaches infinity. Thus, a necessary condition 
for the existence of informality is that search frictions in the formal sector exist, as explained 
in detail in Zenou (2008). Lastly we have   *
0
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
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
 , and   *
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, indicating the informality and unemployment rates prevalent when there is no formal sector. 
 
2.4.3. Existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium 
 
With the above results, and given a certain value of the labor market tightness parameter  , it 
is possible to determine all the endogenous variables in the model. Replacing (2.32) (the 
formal sector equilibrium wage) and (2.35)  (the informality rate in the steady-state) into 
(2.30), we obtain the following condition determining the formal job creation rate in 
equilibrium * :  
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 Let   be the expression on the left hand side of (2.37). Assuming that formal sector 
productivity is always higher than the expected income of the unemployed, we have that:  
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and consequently, it is always the case that  
0
> 0, lim = , lim < 0
 

 
     . Thus, there 
must be a unique *  that satisfies (2.37), and consequently, there is a unique steady-state 
equilibrium. 
 
 
2.4.4. Wage equation under different assumptions for the commuting frequency of the 
unemployed 
 
So far we have assumed that the commuting frequency of formal workers and the 
unemployed is the same  = =1F US S . We showed that in this case, the bid rents for formal 
and unemployed workers are the same, and that they are steeper than the bid rent of informal 
workers. This means that formal and informal workers share area  0, INN L , whereas 
informal workers live further away, in area  ,INN L N  (see Figure 13). We now consider 
two alternative assumptions for the commuting frequency of the unemployed ( )
U
S , and show 
that our analysis holds for both cases. The first alternative is that the unemployed live in an 
intermediate area between formal and informal workers. Formally, this translates into 
assuming that   2 21> > 4U c hS w w T , that is, that the bid rent of the unemployed is 
smaller than the bid rent of formal workers but larger than the bid rent of informal workers. 
In this case, it can be shown that the wage equals:  
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where   = 1 U FB S T L  . Under the second alternative, the unemployed have a smaller 
bid rent than formal and informal workers, so that 
       2 2 2> 4 4 > Uc h c hT w w and w w T N S   . In this case, the wage is:  
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   (2.40) 
 
Comparing equations (2.39) and (2.40)  with equation (2.32), it becomes evident that the 
same spatial compensation term discussed previously appears in both cases. The difference is 
that now formal firms have to offer a spatial compensation also to the unemployed, given that 
they commute less frequently to the CBD ( <1)
U
S . We can thus conclude that the spatial 
compensation linked to informal employment appears as long as formal workers live closer to 
the CBD than informal workers, independently of where the unemployed locate. Furthermore, 
the spatial compensation arising because of the existence of an informal sector is additional to 
any possible compensation offered to the unemployed when they commute less frequently to 
the CBD. 
 
2.5. Comparative statics 
 
We now analyze the effects of changes in: 1) variables that represent the structure of the city 
(fixed commuting cost T , marginal commuting cost  , and total population N ), and; 2) 
variables that represent the direct income of informal workers (home-based remuneration 
hw , CBD remuneration cw , and social protection subsidies b ), on the equilibrium formal job 
creation rate *  and the equilibrium informality rate * . Totally differentiating equation 
(2.37) leads to:       * =p p        , where p  is any exogenous parameter. 
Given that   > 0  , the sign of  * p   is the opposite of  p  . Additionally we 
have that:     * * * *=p p         , and because  * * < 0   , the sign of 
 * p   is the same of  p   . So, it is enough to find  p   to establish in which 
direction *  and *  change. 
 
Regarding the structure of the city, using (2.37) it is possible to show that   > 0T  , 
which implies that a rise in T  generates a decrease in *  and an increase in * . The rise in 
fixed commuting costs increases formal urban costs, but at the same time decreases the net 
profit informal workers obtain by commuting to the CBD. Because the increase of the former 
is larger than the decrease of the latter, there is a larger spatial compensation, and a larger 
salary, paid by formal firms. Job creation in the formal sector is negatively affected by this 
larger wage, which ultimately results in a larger informal sector. This leads to a key insight of 
our model: reducing fixed commuting costs, by for instance improving the transportation 
infrastructure, can lead to a reduction in the informality rate. A similar analysis can be done 
for the case of changes in marginal commuting costs and changes in population size. 
 
Regarding the direct income of informal workers, from (2.37) it is possible to show that 
  > 0hw  , which implies that a rise in hw  generates a decrease in 
*  and an increase in 
* . A rise in the informal home-based remuneration increases the income for informal 
workers, and at the same time reduces formal urban costs (informal workers reduce their 
commuting frequency, which in turn relaxes the competition for land near the CBD). The 
latter effect is not large enough to offset the increase in informal income, so ultimately there is 
a larger spatial compensation, and a larger salary paid by formal firms. Again, job creation in 
the formal sector is negatively affected by this larger wage, which results in a larger informal 
sector. 
 
The effect of a change in informal CBD remuneration has the same effect, but works through a 
different mechanism. From (2.37), we have that   > 0cw  . A rise in the CBD 
remuneration increases formal urban costs, because informal workers, in response, rise their 
commuting frequency, intensifying the competition for land near the CBD. As a consequence, 
formal firms are forced to offer a higher wage. As in the previous case, job creation in the 
formal sector is negatively affected, resulting in a larger informal sector. Finally, an increase in 
social protection subsidies reduces job creation and increases the informality rate. Larger 
transfers to informal workers translate into higher income, consequently increasing the 
unemployed reserve wage, and in turn the compensation that formal firms must bear. We 
now turn to the analysis of policies. 
 
2.6.  Informality and the impact of policies 
 
An important policy objective in cities in developing countries is to diminish informality rates. 
The underlying idea is that a reduction in informality, or an increase in the size of the formal 
sector, unequivocally improves public welfare. Replacing informal jobs for formal ones has 
important consequences in terms of productivity and incomes, and also alleviates the subsidy 
budget burden in countries where a large proportion of the population does not contribute to 
social protection (Ferreira and Robalino, 2010). As we have shown in the previous section, 
reducing commuting costs is a way in which this policy objective can be achieved. However, 
are transport policies the most efficient way to reduce informality? And, which group, if any, 
should transport policies target? In this section we focus on these two questions by assuming 
that the local government has a fixed amount of money M  to be used in one of four policies: 
1) subsidizing a fraction of hiring costs of each formal firm; subsidizing a fraction of transport 
costs of 2) each worker, 3) each formal worker, or 4) each informal worker. It is important to 
note here that the amount of the subsidy given to each economic unit has to adjust 
endogenously to changes in the number of beneficiaries in order to always meet the 
budgetary restriction of the government. We assume that no person receives a higher or 
lower subsidy than the next. 
 
2.6.1.  Four policy options compared 
 
We now turn to the analysis of the four proposed policies in equilibrium. Under the first policy 
option, the government assumes fraction c  of the hiring costs of each firm, so that the 
effective costs diminish and become  1 c c . The subsidy has the effect of reducing 
informality rates, as it can be shown that  * < 0c  . The budget constraint under the first 
policy option, a hiring-costs subsidy, can be expressed as * *= cM c u N  , given that 
* * *=V u N . This implies that the hiring-costs subsidy is endogenous and equal to:  
 
 
* *
= .c
M
c u N


  (2.41) 
 
Since 0 < <1c , it must be the case that * *<M c u N . Equation (2.41) shows that the 
amount of the subsidy granted diminishes with an increase in either formal job creation, 
unemployment, the total population or hiring-costs. The expression for the equilibrium 
condition for this and the subsequent policy options can be found in the appendix. Under the 
second policy option, the government assumes a fraction   of fixed commuting costs of each 
worker (independent of their status), so that effectively they become  1 T . As shown in 
the comparative statics analysis, this subsidy has the effect of diminishing informality rates. 
Under this option, the government's budget constraint can be expressed as =M TN , 
implying that:  
 
 = .
M
TN
   (2.42) 
 
Again, given that 0 < <1 , it must be the case that <M TN . To ensure the segmented 
equilibrium described in Figure 13, it is necessary that     1 > 2c hT w w  . Under the 
third policy option, the government gives each formal worker a fraction F  of her fixed 
commuting costs. The government's budget constraint under this option can be written as 
 *= 1FM T N  , so that:  
 
 *
= .
1
F M
T N


  (2.43) 
 
And as 0 < <1F ,  *< 1M T N  must hold. Finally, under the fourth policy option the 
government gives each informal worker a fraction IN  of her fixed commuting costs. The 
government's budget constraint in this case can be written as *= INM T N  , so that:  
 
 
*
= .IN
M
T N


  (2.44) 
 
And as 0 < <1IN , *<M T N  must hold. Again, to ensure the segmented equilibrium, it is 
necessary that     1 > 2IN c hT w w  . 
 
2.6.2. Base model calibration and comparative analysis of policies 
 
The model is calibrated to produce levels of informality, formality and unemployment close to 
the levels of Latin American cities. The parameter values (with a year as the implicit unit of 
time) shown in Table 2 are within the range of those used in previous studies (Albrecht, et al., 
2009; Zenou, 2008; Zenou 2011). 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 General   Value  
Discount rate r   0.05  
Unemployed current income 
U
w    0  
Commuting costs p/u of distance     0.01  
Fixed commuting costs T    0.11  
Total population N    100  
Formal   Value  
Productivity 
F
y    1 
Worker's bargaining power     0.5 
Formal job destruction rate 
F
    0.3  
Cost of maintaining a vacancy c    0.2 
Matching function  ,Ud S U V    
0.5 0.5U V  
Informal   Value  
Informal job creation rate     1.4  
Informal job destruction rate 
IN
    0.5  
Home-based remuneration hw    0.3  
CBD remuneration cw    0.4  
Transfers b    0.5  
Table 2.  Parameter values 
 
 The first row of Table 3 displays the steady-state equilibrium values under these conditions. 
Under the specified values, the model predicts an unemployment rate of 16.54% and an 
informality rate of 46.31%. For the total population values, the model predicts that 
approximately 54% of all employed workers are in the informal sector. This value is close to 
recent estimates for Latin American countries (Galvis, 2012; Jütting, et al., 2008; Vanek, et al., 
2014). The informal/formal wage ratio according to the model is 0.41, slightly below 
estimates for Mexico, Argentina and Colombia (Albrecht, et al., 2009). 
 
  
 
  
 Pos.     *    *    *u    *V    *W    Subsidy  
 Base equilibrium 0.45 46.31 16.54 7.51 868.90  
1 Hiring-costs subsidy 1.53 35.34 12.62 19.31 886.07 0.51 
2 Transport subsidy (all) 0.84 40.79 14.57 12.31 880.59 0.18 
3 Transport subsidy (formal) 0.54 44.69 15.96 8.72 872.97 0.32 
- Transport subsidy (informal) 0.45 46.32 16.54 7.50 868.87 0.39 
 
Table 3.  Policy efficiency comparison 
   
Next, we evaluate the performance of policies through two indicators: the change in the 
informality rate and the change in general welfare. Welfare is measured as the production 
level in the city W  (Sato, 2004; Zenou, 2009), given by:  
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   (2.45) 
 
Thus, the production level in equilibrium is the sum of formal and informal sector production, 
the income of the unemployed and the transfers made to informal workers minus the cost of 
maintaining vacancies, the commuting costs for formal workers and the commuting costs for 
informal workers. Wages in the formal sector and land rents are pure transfers, so they do not 
enter the production level calculations. We now compare the four proposed policies for a total 
budget of = 2M . Table 3 shows the results. The first thing to note is that subsidizing formal 
firms hiring-costs is the most efficient option because it generates the highest level of welfare, 
the largest number of vacancies, the lowest unemployment rate and the lowest informality 
rate. The subsidy causes lower wages in the formal sector, because now the current and future 
productivity matching (the second part of (2.32)) is smaller. Consequently, job creation is 
positively affected, which reduces informality. Additionally, as can be seen from equation 
(2.30), because the subsidy makes it cheaper to formal firms to keep vacancies, job creation is 
directly and positively affected. This is precisely why this policy is the most efficient, since any 
other option considered only works through wages. 
 Second, a transport subsidy targeted to informal workers is an undesirable policy because it 
does not affect the informality and unemployment rates, and because it leads to a small 
decrease in total welfare. With the subsidy, informal workers can access the CBD at a lower 
costs, which increases the net profit they derive from commuting to the CBD. Consequently, 
formal firms have to pay a larger spatial compensation in order to attract workers, which 
results in a decrease in formal job creation and an increase in the informality rate. The 
increase in informality, however, has an additional, offsetting effect. Because the number of 
formal workers has effectively diminished, there is less competition for land at the CBD, which 
lowers the urban costs and consequently the formal wage. With a lower formal wage, there is 
more formal employment creation and a lower informality rate. In the end, the informality 
rate is the same as it was initially, implying that the subsidy had no impact. 
 
Third, in terms of efficiency, a transport subsidy for all workers outperforms a transport 
subsidy to formal workers only. Given the previous result, and the fact that the size of the 
transport subsidy per head for formal workers is larger than the transport subsidy per head 
for all workers, this result is unexpected. The explanation is as follows. First, the transport 
subsidy for formal workers decreases the spatial compensation. This encourages job creation 
and reduces informality. This rises the formal wage, which partially mitigates the informality 
reduction. With the transport subsidy to all workers, the spatial compensation also decreases, 
but the pressure generated on wages is lower because the subsidy to informal workers tends 
to lower the wage. 
 
2.6.3.  Sensitivity analysis 
 
In order to check the robustness of the results, we compare the first three policy options for 
different parameter values. The solid curve represents the transport subsidy for formal 
workers, the dashed curve represents the transport subsidy for all workers and the dotted 
curve represents the hiring-costs subsidy. We first consider hiring costs. As can be seen in 
Figure 14, the hiring-costs subsidy generates the largest welfare value and the lowest 
informality rate regardless of the value that the hiring-cost parameter takes. Thus, the 
conclusion that the hiring-costs subsidy is the most efficient policy holds for any value of 
hiring costs. On the same vein, our main results regarding the transport subsidies hold: for 
any given level of hiring costs, we still reach the conclusion that a transport subsidy for all 
workers outperforms a transport subsidy for formal workers. Finally, our results hold when 
we compare the three policies for a different amount of public resources (Figure 15) and for 
different bargaining power (Figure 16). 
 
 
Figure 14.   a: Total welfare vs Hiring costs. b: Informality rate vs Hiring costs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 15.  a: Total welfare vs Public resources. b: Informality rate vs Public resources 
 
 
 Figure 16.  a: Total welfare vs Bargaining power. b: Informality rate vs Bargaining power 
 
2.7.  Discussion and Conclusions 
 
The decision to be informal may be not only related to income-related factors, such as the 
existence of social insurance subsidies, but also to accessibility (Moreno-Monroy, 2012). We 
have developed a search-matching model where formal workers commute every day to the 
CBD to work, and informal workers choose their optimal commuting frequency given the 
possibility to earn their income at home or at the CBD. A segmented city arises from the 
model, with formal workers and the unemployed located closer to the CBD, and informal 
workers located in the periphery. We characterized a steady-state equilibrium where the 
informality rate, land prices and wages are endogenously determined. According to our 
model, the informality rate is positively affected by an increase in fixed or variable commuting 
costs. This means that investments in improving accessibility, such as the expansion and 
development of an Integrated Transport System, can reduce the size of the urban informal 
sector. 
 
We use this model to compare different policy options for reducing informality, and reach two 
main conclusions. First, we find a transport subsidy targeted exclusively to informal workers 
to be an undesirable policy because it has a neutral effect on the informality rate, and even a 
slightly negative effect on welfare. On the other hand, a subsidy to all workers does generate 
reductions in the informality rate and increases in welfare. This result is relevant for policy 
makers in cities where these type of targeted subsidies are being implemented or considered 
at the moment. Using transport accessibility analysis for Bogotá, (Bocarejo and Oviedo, 2012) 
suggest that a cross-subsidy policy subsidizing fares for the lower-income population and 
taxing fares for the higher-income population would generate benefits in terms of equity 
given better access to job opportunities. However, their analysis does not consider the 
existence of informal (home-based) employment and related commuting decisions of informal 
workers. Our approach shows that mobility-related social inclusion policies of this type can 
potentially harm formal employment creation. Alternative policy designs could consider 
targeted subsidies linked to localized formal job creation programs, in order to ensure that 
better access also means better jobs. However, it is important to point out that subsidizing 
hiring costs is more efficient than subsidizing transport in reducing informality. 
 
Finally, it is important to note that at present, our model assumes the transition between 
formal and informal jobs to be random, which is unrealistic. The extension of endogenous 
commuting choices for informal workers can also be refined further in order to also 
endogenize the return to different informal activities taking place within the city, and take 
into account likely effects such as congestion. Along these lines, more evidence is needed on 
the relationship between commuting frequencies and the choice of informal activities, in 
order to better understand the impact on transport policies on labor market outcomes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2.8. Appendix A 
 
Equilibrium conditions of four policy options 
 
Hiring-costs subsidy: 
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where c  is determined by Equation (2.41). 
 
Transport subsidy to all workers: 
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where   is determined by Equation (2.42). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Transport subsidy to formal workers only: 
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where F  is determined by Equation (2.43). 
 
Transport subsidy to informal workers only: 
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where IN  is determined by Equation (2.44). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three 
Informal housing, spatial structure and city’s 
compactness22 
 
3.1. Introduction  
 
In its 2010/2011 State of the World´s Cities (SWC) report, UN-HABITAT defines a slum 
household as a group of individuals living in an urban area under the same roof, which lacks 
one or more of the following: durable housing, sufficient living space, easy access to safe 
water, access to adequate sanitation, and security of tenure. Given the high incidence of slums 
in the developing world (by 2010 the number of slum dwellers was estimated up to 828 
million; UN-HABITAT, 2010) and its close relationship with urban poverty, slum reduction is 
an imperative for national and local authorities.  
 
All through a combination of housing, land, infrastructure and poverty-reduction policies, a 
total of 227 million people moved out of slum conditions between 2000 and 2010, thus 
causing a fall in the proportion of the urban population living in slums from 39% to an 
estimated 32% (UN-HABITAT, 2010, pág. 32 and 42). Therefore, cities in developing countries 
are experiencing rapid urbanization in which slum dwellers are more integrated with the 
urban economy, are legalizing their tenure status, and are acquiring durable housing with 
basic services. 
 
In Latin America, it is common that the production of new durable housing takes place outside 
government regulations. In Colombia, for example, through the Integral Neighborhood 
Improvement Program (Mejoramiento Integral de Barrios), the authorities stimulated in-situ 
incremental house improvements and its connection to basic services. However, the 
connection to the infrastructure is usually remedial, and house improvements rarely fulfill 
                                  
22 I would like to thank Ana Isabel Moreno-Monroy, Juan Carlos Guataqui, and the participants of seminars at 
Universidad del Rosario, and University of Antioquia for helpful comments and suggestions. I acknowledge 
financial support of Universidad de Antioquia, Colciencias and Conalpe. 
urban and taxation regulations. Specifically in Medellin, houses in neighborhoods called 
“comunas” are usually self-constructed, with inefficient technology, neglecting the payment of 
taxes, and connecting the house to the infrastructure of public services once it is built. This is 
not surprising given a general context where historically only 35% of houses have been 
formally generated and where there is excessive paperwork, and lack of transparency in the 
tax and planning system (Minvivienda, Gobierno de Colombia, 2010). 
 
In this way, there is a variant of informal housing production which is not related with extreme 
poverty and illegal occupation of land, characterized by a remedial connection to infrastructure, 
non-compliance with urban standards and tax evasion. It is reasonable to think that this type of 
informality helps explaining important features shown by Latin America cities. Some of these 
are: the fast spatial expansion23, the prevalence of short buildings, and the hosting of 
peripheries where low-income workers and precarious short buildings concentrate (UN-
HABITAT, 2010; Zenou, 2011; Da Mata, 2013).  
 
This is because informal constructions are close substitutes for formal constructions, implying 
that it occupy land that could have been used by the formal sector, consequently affecting the 
land market (Smolka and Biderman, 2011), the productivity in the housing industry, and 
finally the shape and the spatial structure of the city. In fact, informal constructions create a 
cost for the society. Its low levels of capital intensity, short height and use of inefficient 
technologies of production, lead to an inefficient use of urban land. This inefficiency can be 
seen in the form of rapid spreading short constructions which consume much more land than 
the required by formal developments.24  This in turn makes the city less compact i.e. lower 
and wider. For example, the common story of slums formation and the proliferation of 
informal settlements is a story with occupation of large extensions of scarce land, by 
invasions, self-constructions, and pirate developments (Smolka and Biderman, 2011; UN-
HABITAT, 2013 ). Informal housing is also a fundamental channel through which other urban 
variables affect the city. For instance, it has been argued that slow infrastructure growth, 
combined with fast population growth results in the proliferation of informal settlements 
(World Bank, 1993; UN-HABITAT, 2013 ). 
                                  
23  Inostroza, et al., (2013) quantified the main parameters of expansion and sprawl for 10 Latin American cities 
between 1990 and 2010.   The authors show a pervasive spatial expansion, where most of the studied cities are 
expanding at fast rates with falling densities trend. 
24 In Bogotá and Medellin formal constructions usually take the form of apartment buildings. 
 To the best of our knowledge, there is no theoretical work that studies the causes of this kind 
of informality. Moreover, there is no theoretical work that studies its consequences (and the 
consequences of informal housing in general) over the city structure. In particular, little is 
known about how land allocated to informal constructions changes with distance to the city 
center, how informal constructions can be compared with formal constructions, and how 
informality affects the size and tallness of the city.25 Additionally, little is known about how 
infrastructure and population growth affect the city through informal settlements. 
 
Previous theoretical literature has focused on the study of slums, emphasizing on issues such 
as illegal dwelling, or income differences combined with land regulations. For example, 
Jimenez (1985) and Brueckner and Selod (2009) study the economics of squatter settlements.  
Da Mata (2013) models and quantifies  slum growth for Brazil, focusing on the role of lack of 
property rights, while Heikkila and Lin (2013) study the implications of minimum lot size 
restrictions and the income differentials in the magnitude of slums. Additionally, in all these 
models, for the households’ point of view, informal housing differs significantly form formal 
housing, and as a consequence there is an important emphasis on modeling the demand for 
land in the informal sector.  This does not facilitate the construction of a framework that 
simultaneously considers intersectoral land mobility, bid rent functions, and differential job 
access, conditions required to include an interdependent informal sector into the urban space. 
 
In this paper we develop a monocentric city model with and informal housing sector, 
characterized by remedial connection to the infrastructure, non-compliance with the urban 
standards and the evasion of taxes. To do so, we focus on the housing supply structure, 
because it allows explaining informality beyond poverty and illegal dwelling, and also allows 
to easily introducing differential job access. Specifically, the main driving force behind 
informality here, is the behavior of informal land developers combined with the behavior of 
the local government. 
 
Informal production in developing countries can be the result of actions of economic agents 
that seek profits. Lack of regulation enforcement and the easy access to rudimentary 
                                  
25 Duranton and Puga (2014) present a detailed review of the monocentric city model literature, together with its 
main extensions and empirical implications. 
technologies create powerful incentives to produce outside regulations (Mejía and Posada, 
2013). Of course, this is also the case in the housing industry, where the importance of 
informal land developers has been recognized. According to Smolka and Biderman (2011), 
pag. 6: “Informality can open a gap for arbitrage, allowing informal developers to reap higher 
profits than formal developers because they avoid paying license fees and taxes, only partially 
provide infrastructure and services, devote smaller percentages of land to public uses, and 
offer below-minimum-size lots. These incentives stimulate supply of informal developments”. 
 
Precisely, these incentives are determined by the local government, as it is responsible of 
taxation, provision of public services infrastructure, and law enforcement. Then, the 
government is a fundamental actor in the determination of the informality level in the housing 
market. So far, in the theoretical literature, the local government plays an absent or secondary 
role. In this sense, informality is, at least partially, the consequence of some sort of state 
incapacity. An interesting and alternative vision of the behavior of the authorities is 
represented in the macroeconomic analysis of Mejía and Posada (2013). The authors consider 
that spending in law enforcement and spending in infrastructure for public services are two 
different instruments used to maximize the level of aggregated formal production in the 
economy. Then, informality is not the result of the hypothetical weakness of the state, and it is 
instead the optimal level achieved and accepted by the government.  In this paper, Mejía and 
Posada’s (2013) view is used to represent the behavior of the local government. Thus for the 
first time in the informal housing literature, enforcement and infrastructure provision are 
endogenous and are fully characterized in the urban space. 
 
More technically, this paper modifies the Muth-Mills model26 adapting the housing industry to 
an environment of two sectors (formal and informal). On the supply side, both informal and 
formal land developers produce a homogenous good (interior living space) using land. 
However, unlike formals, informal producers evade taxes (value added taxes) and do not use 
the infrastructure for public services as an input (i.e. they do not pay infrastructure rent). This 
                                  
26 Brueckner (1987) provides an excellent presentation of the Muth-Mills model. This is a model of urban spatial 
structure where land is an intermediate input in the production of housing.  An important result obtained with the 
model is that structural density (capital-land ratio) is a decreasing function of the distance, so buildings are shorter 
farther from the CBD.  According to Brueckner (1987), the explanation for this is that lower land rents are required 
at greater distances to compensate producers for the lower price per square foot of housing. The resulting decline 
with distance in the relative price of land causes producer substitution in its favor, leading to lower structural 
densities. 
forces informal producers to use inefficient technology of production, and to bear the risk of 
being detected and fined for evading regulations. As intersectoral land mobility is assumed, a 
general equilibrium framework (analogous to the specific factor model of international trade) 
is used in the analysis of the land market. The land endowment is exogenous and fixed, must 
be fully employed, and is owned by absentee landlords. On the demand side, the households 
are renters, consume a fixed amount of housing, and perceive informal and formal production 
as perfect substitutes. To improve the model's predictions about  socio-economic segregation 
and the density patterns within the city, two household’s types are considered: the high-
income and the low-income, where the latter compared with the former receives less income, 
consumes less housing and commutes with less frequency. 
 
There is a local government that maximizes formal housing production through both spending 
in law enforcement and public services infrastructure. The increase in law enforcement raises 
the likelihood of detection (and thereby punishment) of informal land developers, whereas 
the rise in public services infrastructure increases the productivity of land in the formal 
sector.  The government finances its spending through taxes raised on formal land developers, 
and fines charged to informal land developers. Both taxes and fines are considered exogenous 
variables. The analysis proceeds in two parts. First, it is assumed that infrastructure and law 
enforcement are exogenous. This allows focusing on the spatial patterns of the informality as 
well as its impact over the city structure. Then, the role of the local government is studied, 
which allows explaining the spatial variations of infrastructure and law enforcement. 
 
In equilibrium, given that public infrastructure  decreases with distance to the city center (this 
will be the optimal decision of the local government), the land allocated to produce short 
informal buildings increases with distance, while land allocated to produce tall formal 
buildings decreases. Thereby, the city’s periphery shows high levels of housing informality, 
under the shape of short buildings.27 At the same time, because low income workers commute 
with less frequency and consume less housing, the periphery gets dense and selectively 
inhabited by them. These characteristics reflect the situation of cities in Latin America and 
rationalize in a simple way how fast city growth combined with slow infrastructure growth 
originate the proliferation of informal housing. 
 
                                  
27 This also implies low structural densities in the periphery 
The comparative statics analysis shows that cities with either a low provision of 
infrastructure, high levels of taxes, or low levels of law enforcement all display a high level of 
housing informality. This implies an allocation of land in favor of the less productive sector, 
causing the city to be less compact (lower and wider), which in turn implies higher land and 
housing rents, as well as lower levels of  utility at equilibrium, for city inhabitants. In this 
sense, informality is costly for society. With these results, the model establishes a clear 
connection between the proliferation of informal housing and the fast spatial expansion, and 
also rationalizes the common observation which holds that informal sector fixes a lower limit 
for land prices, raising the land price for the formal sector (Smolka, 2003). The analysis also 
shows that local governments can invest in infrastructure, can cut taxes or can strengthen the 
enforcement in order to encourage formalization and make the city more compact.  
 
Regarding the local government behavior, given that the law enforcement is the opportunity 
cost of the infrastructure and vice versa, location at every point of the city comes with an 
optimal level of informal housing. As housing rents decrease with distance to the city center, 
there is a tax revenue decrease, which in turn leads to reduction in the optimal levels of both 
law enforcement and infrastructure, as distance increases. Thus, the slow growth of the public 
infrastructure is not necessarily the result of the lack of responsiveness of the State to the fast 
urban growth, instead, it is the result of an optimal decision of the government under 
resource restrictions. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows:  Section 2 presents the related literature. 
Section 3 presents the model set up, whereas Section 4 depicts the equilibrium. Comparative 
static experiments are displayed in Section 5. Section 6 introduces and analyzes the behavior 
of the local government and Section 7 studies the implications of informal housing on rural-
urban migration. Section 8 summarizes and concludes. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.2. Related  literature 
 
This document is mainly related with the theories on the interlinked nature of the formal and 
informal sectors in the urban land market.  Brueckner and Selod (2009) have been the first to 
deal with this issue. They have developed a general equilibrium framework where squatter 
settlements (which configure the informal housing sector) compete with formal households 
for the same land. The basic mechanism of the model works as follows: squatters settlements 
“squeeze” the formal land market, raising the formal price. This invites the landowners to 
consider the possibility of evicting the squatters. Then, in order to escape eviction, the 
squatter communities control the squeezing and the costs of eviction for the landowners. 
Through this model, the fraction of the urban land that goes to the formal sector and the 
fraction that goes to the informal sector can be established. Moreover, the model allows for 
studying the welfare effects of formalization policies. Specifically, the analysis shows that the 
squatting equilibrium is inefficient. 
 
In the work of Heikkila and Lin (2013), rich households compete for land with poor ones. In 
this scenario, the authorities impose a minimum lot size restriction, which is always fulfilled 
by the rich while unaffordable for some (or all) of the poor. This forces the poor to leave the 
formal area, implying that they stop paying the formal land rent and only achieve the 
minimum consumption of land and other goods. In this way, an informal sector in the land 
market is created. The authors implement the “everyone lives somewhere” vision, using a 
Linear Expenditure System (LES) for the demand of housing and other goods that builds in 
minimum “basic needs” for livelihood. The analysis shows that while the informal sector is 
larger, the welfare gains for the wealthy households are larger. This is so because the model 
shows that the higher the number of poor households in the informal sector, the lower the 
aggregate demand for land in the formal sector is, leading to a rent subsidy in the formal 
sector. Finally, Brueckner (2013) extends the work of Brueckner and Selod (2009) by 
replacing the benevolent squatter organizer with competing, rent-seeking organizers. The 
analysis shows that the rent seeking behavior leads the market to assign more land to the 
squatter settlements.  
 
On this document, in contrast with previous models, the interactions between the informal 
and the formal sector emerge in the supply side of the economy. More specifically, the 
existence of informal land developers creates land competition between these and formal land 
developers. We study this competition with a basic neoclassical general equilibrium 
framework, analogous to the one used to study the labor market in the specific factors model 
of international trade. This allows, for a given level of the housing rent, to find a unique 
equilibrium land rent level as well a unique land allocation. Also, in contrast with previous 
models, here the role of housing demand is simplified. In particular, we assume that 
households consume a fixed quantity of housing and evaluate the formal and the informal 
production as perfect substitutes. This permits to easily incorporate differential job access. 
Using these elements together, we can calculate the bid rents (housing rents) and then 
determine at each distance of the city center, the land rent and the land allocation. Through 
this, for the first time in the literature, informal housing is placed within the city, making it 
possible to inquest into its spatial patterns as well as its implications over the city shape. 
 
The simple structure of the model provides an additional advantage: the possibility to study 
the behavior of the local government. In the existing theoretical literature, the eviction of 
informal households is usually the way that land law is enforced. Because the law, regulations, 
and enforcement are defined at the government level, in this literature the local government 
should have played a crucial role in the determination of the level of the eviction. However, 
this was not the case; as a matter of fact, the local government seems to be clearly absent. In 
Jimenez (1984), Jimenez (1985) and Kapoor and Le Blanc (2008), eviction takes the form of 
an additional exogenous risk of the informal investments. In Turnbull (2008), eviction 
depends on the optimal decision of the landowners. In Brueckner and Selod (2009) and 
Brueckner (2013), it is the squatter organizer who drives the economy to achieve the no-
eviction condition. 
 
A similar situation is found when considering the provision of infrastructure and land 
regulations, which are other ways through which the government affects informality. Da Mata 
(2013), using a balanced budget constraint, considers the role of the public expenditures and 
taxes. Heikkila and Lin (2013) consider the role of minimum lot size restrictions. However, in 
none of these studies the local government has an objective function, which means that it 
plays a secondary role. Adapting the macroeconomic analysis of Mejía and Posada (2013), 
here the local government maximizes the formal production under income restrictions using 
the spending in the law enforcement and the spending in infrastructure. Thus, for the first 
time in the informal housing literature, these variables are endogenous and fully 
characterized in the urban space. 
 
3.3. A model of informal housing 
 
3.3.1. The city 
 
The city is linear, monocentric and closed, and its Central Business District (CBD) is at the 
origin (zero). Urban residents demand housing services, which are produced from land and 
public infrastructure by the firms in the housing industry. There is a local government that 
charges taxes and fines, and provides law enforcement and infrastructure for public services. 
These variables are initially exogenous to facilitate the study of informality implications in the 
urban space. Land is owned by absentee landlords. The urban land market is assumed to be 
competitive. In this way, at any distance x  from the CBD, all agents take the housing rent 
 HR x  and the land rent  R x  as given. In the city there is no vacant land, and land areas 
not used for residential purposes are assumed to be used for agricultural production. The 
agricultural rent is exogenous and equal to zero. 
 
3.3.2. Households 
 
Each household contains one urban resident who commutes to a job in the CBD, consumes a 
fixed quantity of housing services, and consumes a composite non-spatial good (which is 
taken as the numeraire, so that its price is normalized to 1). The households are renters, and 
perceive informal and formal production as perfect substitutes. Following Xiao (2013), the 
model considers two households types: the high-income, labeled A , and the low income, 
labeled B . In comparison with the former, the later receives less income, consumes less 
housing, and commutes with less frequency. As in Heikkila and Lin (2013), this is only a 
simplification of the idea that there are “haves” and “have-nots” in cities. In the developing 
world, the “haves” can be thought as the workers in the formal sector and the “have-nots” can 
be thought as the workers in a decentralized informal sector. Whereas in Heikkila and Lin 
(2013) this heterogeneity plays a crucial role in explaining informality, in this work it does 
not, so the heterogeneity is only considered to improve the model predictions about socio-
economic segregation and about density patterns.          
 The masses of the two household types are given by AM  and BM . When an A  resident lives 
in the city at distance x  from the CBD, he receives a fixed income Ay , consumes Az  units of 
the non-spatial composite good, consumes one unit of housing, pays a housing rent   HR x  
and pays  x  in commuting costs, where   is the cost per unit of distance. Then the budget 
constraint for this resident at distance x  is: 
 
 
  .  H A AzxR x y   (2.50) 
  
Assuming that the utility function is given by   A AU z z  and using the budget constraint, we 
have that the indirect utility function at distance x  is:  
 
 
   .  A A Hu x y x R x   (2.51) 
  
Similarly, when a B  resident lives in the city at a distance x   from the CBD, he receives a 
fixed income  By , consumes Bz   units of the non-spatial composite good, consumes d   units 
of housing, pays a rent  HdR x   and pays  s x   in commuting costs, where s   is the cost per 
unit of distance. It is assumed that 1s , 1d  and  ABy y , which reflects that this type of 
household, compared with the A type, receives less income, consumes less housing and 
commute with less frequency. It is also assumed that  / 1s d . This means that for a given 
level of housing consumption d , the low-income household commutes with little frequency.  
The budget constraint at distance x  is:
  
 
 
  ,  H B BdR s x z yx   (2.52) 
 
  
and again, given that the utility function is   ,B BU z z   the indirect utility at distance x  is: 
 
 
   .  B B Hu y s x dRx x   (2.53) 
   
The corresponding bid rents functions for each resident type are given by the following 
equations: 
 
 
 , ,   A A A Ax u y x u   (2.54) 
  
 
   
1
, ,   B B B Bx u y s x u
d
  (2.55) 
  
which indicates the maximum land rent that a  A B  resident type is willing to pay in order to 
reach a utility level  A Bu u .  As it can be verified, these functions are linear and decreasing in 
x . It is also possible to verify that  ,A Ax u  is steeper than  , ,B Bx u  given that 
 / 1.s d  This means that, in equilibrium, A  residents live close to the CBD, whereas B  
residents live in the periphery. This specification resembles a city with socio-economic 
segregation where lower-income workers are poorly connected with the CBD and are 
relegated to peripheral areas. This is often the case in the developing world (Da Mata, 2013).   
The analysis will not consider the case of the “integrated” city equilibrium, which locates the 
high-income households at the periphery and the low- income households near the CBD (this 
equilibrium emerges when  / 1s d ). This is because, as remarked above, households’ land 
demand conditions have nothing to do with the levels of housing informality. For the analysis, 
the only implication of this scenario is that the initial equilibrium utility levels of the 
households change. Moreover, as it will be shown below, a rise in the housing informality 
always decreases the equilibrium utility levels of city inhabitants, regardless of the initial 
equilibrium location. 
 
3.3.3. Housing industry 
 
It is widely accepted that a significant part of informal production in developing countries is 
not necessarily related with poverty, and it is instead the result of economic agents’ actions 
that seek profits. The lack of regulations enforcement and easy access to rudimentary 
technologies create powerful incentives to produce outside regulations. In the housing 
industry, this is observed in informal developers who obtain benefits by providing housing 
through a process characterized by taxes evasion, incomplete provision of infrastructure and 
services, and the use of inefficient technologies (Smolka and Biderman, 2011). This 
production, however, creates a cost for the society because informal settlements use land that 
could have been used by the more efficient formal sector. Next, we use these elements in a 
synthetic way to represent a housing industry with an informal sector.   
 
Consider, then, that at distance x  to the CBD, interior living space (a homogeneous good) is 
produced in two sectors that coexist: the formal and the informal. In the formal sector, firms 
pay taxes (value added taxes), produce using land and infrastructure for public services, and 
have a high but decreasing marginal productivity of land. In contrast, in the informal sector, 
firms do not pay taxes, only use land to produce, have low and constant marginal productivity 
of land, and may be detected and fined for avoiding the regulations. The technology in the 
formal sector is given by: 
 
 
     
1
,
 
F F FQ x A Z x L x   (2.56) 
  
where  FQ x  is the formal output at ,x    FL x  is the land used in the formal sector at x  (to 
be determined in equilibrium) and  Z x  is the level of the public infrastructure at x , which 
is exogenous (for now) and decreases with distance to the CBD according to:  
 
 
  . xZ x Ze   (2.57) 
  
This reflects how infrastructure growth always goes behind city growth. As we will show 
below, this pattern comes as a result of the optimal decision of the local government that 
maximizes the formal production. Since 0FA  and 0 1,   (2.56) shows constant returns 
to scale and decreasing marginal productivity of land. Denoting the tax rate with ,t  which is 
constant along the city, each profit maximizer firm in the formal sector solves: 
 
  
                 1max 1      
F
F H F F F
L x
x R x t A Z x L x R x L x v x Z x  
  at each     0, , fx x   
  (2.58) 
 
where  R x  is the land rent at x ,  HR x  is the housing rent at ,x   v x  is the rental rate of 
the public infrastructure at x , and fx  is the city fringe, all of these to be determined in 
equilibrium. Given that the housing industry operates under perfect competition, the first 
order condition yields: 
 
 
      
1
1 ,



 H FR x t A z x R x   (2.59) 
 
where      / Fz x Z x L x  is the infrastructure for land unit. This condition determines the 
land demand in the formal sector, and given a decreasing marginal productivity of land, it 
shows an inverse relationship between  FL x  and  R x  for a fixed level of  HR x . This is 
illustrated by the   FR x curve in Figure 18, read from left-to-right, in a diagram where the 
vertical axis represents land quantities and the horizontal axis represents the level of land 
rent. In the informal sector, the technology is: 
 
 
    ,IN IN INQ x A L x   (2.60) 
  
where  INQ x  is the informal output at x  and  INL x  is the land used in the informal sector 
at x  (to be determined in equilibrium). Given that 0,INA  land productivity is constant. The 
informal firm can be detected when evading taxes with a probability 1 ,  where   is 
between 0 and 1. This probability does not depend on the distance to the CBD and is 
exogenous. Later, when we study the behavior of the local government, this probability will be 
a function of the spending in law enforcement. For simplicity’s sake, if the firm is detected, its 
income will be confiscated. Therefore, in this sector, each firm maximizes expected profits 
given by: 
 
 
          max   
IN
IN H IN IN IN
L x
x R x A L x R x L x    at each     0, , fx x  (2.61) 
and again, given that the housing industry operates under perfect competition, the first order 
condition yields: 
 
 
    H INR x A R x , (2.62) 
 
which determines the demand for land in this sector. Since   and INA  are fixed and 
exogenous, when     H INR x A R x   informal firms do not demand land, and when 
    H INR x A R x  the demand does not exist. Finally, when     , H INR x A R x any 
amount of land is demanded (this is illustrated by  IN x  curve in Figure 18, which can be 
read from right-to-the left in the diagram). We assume that: 
 
 
 
1 


F f INA Z x A ,  (2.63) 
 
which guarantees that land is always more productive in the formal sector. There is free 
intersectoral land mobility, which links the two sectors in a general equilibrium framework. 
Land supply at each x   is equal to one and must be fully employed, that is: 
 
  
    1. F INL x L x   (2.64) 
  
Finally, for simplicity we assume that land developers income and government income (taxes 
and penalizations) are spent outside the city. 
 
 
3.4. Equilibrium and intra-city analysis  
 
The analysis proceeds in two stages. First, given the city fringe *
fx , and the frontier between 
A  residents  zone and B  residents zone
 
*
bx , the equilibrium utility levels 
*
Au , 
*
Bu , and the 
equilibrium housing rent  *HR x  are found. Then, 
*
fx  and 
*,bx  are found, after the land rent 
 * ,R x  the land allocation between sectors,  *FL x  and  
*
INL x , and the housing production 
 *Q x  are found at each distance x .  As mentioned above,  ,A Ax u   is steeper than 
 , .B Bx u  Then, in equilibrium, A  residents live close to the CBD, whereas B    residents 
live in the periphery. Using this, in equilibrium we have: 
 
 
   * * * *, , A b A B b Bx u x u ,  (2.65) 
 
 
 * *, 0, B f Bx u   (2.66) 
  
       * * * *max , , , ,  0     for each     0, .    H A A B B fR x x u x u x x   (2.67) 
  
Therefore, given *
fx  and
*
bx , it is possible to find both the equilibrium utility levels 
*
Au  and 
*
Bu  
and the equilibrium housing rent  *HR x . Equation (2.66) shows that the bid rent for B  
residents is zero at *
fx . This, as it will be shown later, ensures that the equilibrium land rent is 
equal to agricultural rent (which is assumed to be zero) at *
fx . Equation (2.65) implies that 
exactly at *
bx , the bid rent of A  residents is equal to the bid rent of B  residents. Finally, 
equation (2.67) states that the equilibrium housing rent function is equal to the upper 
envelope of the equilibrium bid rent curves of all residents and the agricultural rent line. 
Using (2.65), (2.66), (2.54), and (2.55) we find that the equilibrium utility levels are: 
 
 
* * , B B fu y s x   (2.68) 
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  (2.69) 
  
 
and replacing (2.68) and (2.69) in (2.54) and (2.55), the housing rent function in equilibrium 
 *HR x  is: 
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  (2.70) 
  
 
This equilibrium is shown in Figure 17, which characterizes a segregated city, where A  
residents live in the area  *0, , bx  and B  residents live in the area 
* *, .  b fx x  Then, as noted 
above, the city displays socio-economic segregation, where lower-income households are 
poorly connected with the CBD and are relegated to peripheral areas.  
 
 
 
Figure 17.  Housing rents in equilibrium (The segregated city) 
 
In order to find *
bx  and 
*
fx , it is necessary to find first the land rent, land allocation, and 
housing production at each distance x . The analysis proceeds in three stages. First, at any 
arbitrary distance x  to the CBD, the land market equilibrium is characterized. This allows us 
to understand how the endogenous variables are determined. Second, a simple comparative 
static analysis shows how these variables evolve in the urban space. In this way we can 
establish the spatial patterns of the informal sector and the spatial patterns of the buildings 
height. Finally, we calculate the total housing production, which allows calculating *
bx  and
*
fx . 
It is assumed that: 
 
 
   
1
1 0

 

 F INt A Z A , (2.71) 
 
which ensures that production will always be positive for both sectors at any distance x . The 
free intersectoral land mobility establishes a common land rent in both sectors, which links 
them in a general equilibrium framework. In equilibrium, the land rent ensures, first, that the 
value of marginal productivity of land is equal between sectors and that total land demand 
equals land supply. Thus, the equilibrium land allocation, at each x , is characterized by: 
 
 
        
1
* * *1 /

 

    IN H H F FA R x R x t A Z x L x ,  (2.72) 
  
which can be represented graphically in Figure 18 as the intersection of the  FR x  and 
 IN x  curves28, at a diagram where the fixed supply of land (which is equal to one) is 
represented by the length of the horizontal axis. Note that the position of land demand curve 
in the formal sector depends on taxes, infrastructure and total factor productivity, whereas 
the position of land demand curve in the informal sector depends on land productivity, and 
the probability of detection. Therefore, the equilibrium land allocation depends on all 
previous variables mentioned. More formally, by restating (2.72), the land in the formal sector 
is: 
 
 
     1/1* , FL x Z x   (2.73) 
                                  
28 See Feenstra (2003) for a presentation of the Specific factors model. 
where  1 /     F INt A A . Replacing (2.73) in the formal sector production function 
(2.56) allows obtaining the equilibrium production level: 
 
 
     /1*   F FQ x A Z x . (2.74) 
  
Because the city is linear, the land in the informal sector is given by: 
 
 
     1/1* 1   INL x Z x   (2.75) 
 
and replacing (2.75) in the production function of the informal sector (2.60), the informal 
production level is: 
 
 
     1/1*   IN IN INQ x A A Z x  . (2.76) 
 
The equilibrium land rent is given by: 
 
 
   * * IN HR x A R x ,  (2.77) 
 
which simply is the value of the expected productivity of land in the informal sector. Finally, 
the rental rate of infrastructure  *v x   can be calculated as the value of its marginal 
productivity: 
 
 
       * * *1 1



  H Fv x R x t A z x . (2.78) 
 
 
Next, we establish the spatial pattern of the informal sector and the spatial pattern of the 
buildings height. 
 
 
  
Figure 18.  Land market equilibrium at distance x to the CBD 
 
 
 
3.4.1. Intraurban spatial patterns of the informal housing  
 
To proceed, let us consider the effects of a small movement away from the CBD, starting from 
any arbitrary location x  in the city. First, as the housing rent decreases with distance, the 
value of marginal productivity of land in both sectors decreases. This is described in Figure 19 
as a simultaneous downward shift of the  FR x  curve       to   'FR x FR x , and the  IN x  
curve        to   'IN x IN x . Because these shifts are of the same proportion for both curves, 
there is a fall in the equilibrium land rent, and no changes in the land allocation. Thus, 
equilibrium land rent decreases with distance from the CBD. Now, because the level of 
infrastructure also decreases with distance, there is an additional downward shift of the 
 FR x  curve     '  to   ''FR x FR x . This occurs because a fall in the infrastructure reduces 
the value of marginal productivity of land in the formal sector. As a consequence, the land 
allocated to the informal sector rises and the land allocated to the formal sector falls, whereas 
the land rent remains as before.  
 
 
Figure 19.  Effects of a rise in the distance to the CBD 
 
Then, in short, informal housing increases with distance to the CBD. Now, what are the 
implications for the spatial structure of the buildings height in the city? Let 
     * * */F F Fq x Q x L x be the buildings height in the informal sector and  
     * * */IN IN INq x Q x L x  the buildings height in the informal sector. Using (2.73), (2.74), 
(2.75) and (2.76) leads to:  
 
 
   * / 1  F INq x A t , (2.79) 
 
and: 
 
 
 * IN INq x A . (2.80) 
  
These quantities do not depend on distance from the CBD. Using (2.63) and (2.71), it can be 
shown that  / 1 1  t , which implies that formal constructions are taller than informal 
constructions. Thus, land allocated to produce short (tall) buildings increases (decreases) 
with distance to the CBD. Furthermore, by defining the average tallness of the buildings as: 
 
 
       * * */ 1 ,     IN F IN INx A t L x A L xq   (2.81) 
  
it is easy to see that it decreases with the  distance to the CBD.  
 
Proposition 1  
Given that the infrastructure for public services decreases with distance to the CBD, the land 
allocated to produce short informal (tall formal) buildings increases (decreases) with distance to 
the CBD. This implies that the average tallness of buildings decrease with distance to the CBD.     
 
Rearranging (2.77) it is possible to see that in equilibrium the relative price of land is equal to: 
   * * H INR x R x A . As a consequence, it does not change with distance. From the point of 
view of the traditional Muth-Mills model, this implies that there is no reason for a systematic 
variation of the buildings height over the urban space.29 However, in the model presented 
here, as we have just shown, a clear spatial pattern emerges, and is mainly explained by how 
land allocation (between sectors) changes with distance in response to the variations in 
infrastructure. This mechanism, which is new in the literature, can be suitable for explaining 
spatial regularities in cities where there is a large informal housing sector.  Additional 
comments are in order. First, using (2.72) it is possible to show that:   
 
 
   
1* / / 1 ,

 

 F INA z x A t   (2.82) 
                                  
29 In the Muth-Mills model lower land rents are required at greater distances to compensate producers for the 
lower price per square foot of housing. The resulting decline with distance in the relative price of land causes 
producer substitution in its favor, leading to lower structural densities. 
 which indicates that in equilibrium the marginal rate of transformation (left side of the 
equation) is equal to the relative (for the producers) price of the informal production, in units 
of formal production (right side of the equation). Because the relative price does not change 
with distance, the infrastructure per unit of land  z x  has to stay constant all over the city to 
guarantee the equilibrium. Thus, the land and the production in the formal sector decrease 
with distance at the same rate as the infrastructure. This explains why the buildings height in 
this sector does not change. Second, also using (2.82), it is possible to see that the relative 
price does not depend on utility levels. Therefore, land allocation and housing production do 
not depend on the equilibrium utility levels, which greatly simplify the analysis. Third, it is 
worth noting that the model contains other potential sources of the spatial variation of 
informality. For example, a similar analysis to the previous one can be done if spatial 
variations in the probability of detection are considered, instead of variations in 
infrastructure. 
 
3.4.2. Closing the model 
 
In equilibrium at the city fringe, the land rent must be equal to the agricultural rent (which is 
assumed equal to zero): 
 
 * * 0fR x , (2.83) 
 
which holds only if the housing rent is equal to zero. This is precisely what the equilibrium 
condition (2.66) ensures. Note that (2.77) along with (2.70) imply that: 
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which describes the land rent along the city. The total housing production at x  is obtained by 
adding the production in the formal sector and the production in the informal sector: 
 
 
       /1* 1 1 / .         IN FQ x A A t Z x   (2.85) 
 
Total production of housing decreases with distance to the CBD. This happens because land 
allocated to the less productive sector increases with distance. Now it is possible to calculate 
the population density. In the A  residents zone,  *Q x  is the density at each x , whereas in 
the B  residents zone, the density is  * /Q x d . In canonical models, population density 
always decreases with distance. However, under this specification, just at the frontier 
between A residents zone and B  residents zone, *bx , the density, jumps and may increase. For 
instance, when d  is small near the frontier *,bx  the B  residents zone is more dense than the 
A  residents zone.  
 
To sum up, in equilibrium, we have these: the housing rent and land rent decrease with 
distance, as shown in canonical models; the city displays socio-economic segregation, where 
lower-income workers are poorly connected with the CBD and are relegated to dense 
peripheral areas; the land allocated to produce short informal (tall formal) buildings increases 
(decreases) with distance to the CBD; and public infrastructure, housing production and the 
average tallness of buildings decrease with distance. These characteristics fit well for cities in 
Latin America, which are characterized by dense peripheries where low income workers and 
precarious short buildings are concentrated, and where there is a poor provision of public 
infrastructure   (UN-HABITAT, 2010; UN-HABITAT, 2013; Da Mata 2013). To close the model 
and find *bx  and 
*
fx , 
the following population constraints are used: 
 
 
 
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bx
AQ x dx M   (2.86) 
  
 
 
*
*
* ,
f
b
x
B
x
Q x dx dM   (2.87) 
  
where  *Q x   is defined by (2.85). It can be shown that (2.86) is equivalent to: 
 
 
 
*
* Ω 1 0,   bxIN b AA x e M   (2.88) 
  
being 
   /1Ω 1 1 /        FA t Z . Let  ΛA be the expression on the left hand side of 
(2.88). It is always the case that: 
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Thus, there must be a unique *
bx  that satisfies (2.88) and therefore (2.86). Using (2.86) and 
(2.87) it can be shown that (2.87)becomes: 
 
 
 
*
*
0
. 
fx
A BQ x dx M dM   (2.89) 
Proceeding in a similar fashion, it can be shown that there must be a unique *
fx  which 
satisfies (2.89). In this way it is shown that the equilibrium exists, and is unique. 
 
 
3.5. Comparative statics and intercity analysis 
 
In this section we investigate the effects of changes in the city's parameters over the informal 
housing and city structure. We focus on the provision of the public infrastructure, taxes, and 
the probability of detection, variables that directly depend on local governments. As in 
Brueckner (1987), we can use the conclusions to make intercity predictions, i.e., we can 
compare separate cities with parameter levels corresponding to the pre- and post-change 
values. 
 
 
 
 
3.5.1. Effects of changes in the provision of the public infrastructure 
 
At each distance  *  0,  fx x  , a fall in the provision of infrastructure Z , reduces the value of 
marginal productivity of land in the formal sector, affecting the land demand given by (2.59), 
but leaving unaffected the land demand in the informal sector (2.62). This is described in 
Figure 20 as a downward shift of the  FR x  curve       to   ''FR x FR x . Initially, this leaves 
the land rent  *R x  unaffected, decreases the land allocation in the formal sector  *FL x  and 
rises its counterpart in the informal sector  *INL x .  Given that land has been now allocated to 
the less productive sector, total housing production  *Q x  and the average height of 
buildings  *q x ,decrease. By using (2.86) and (2.89), it can be seen that the frontier *bx  and 
the city fringe *
fx  have to rise, which shows that as the housing production is lower at each x , 
the city has to spread to accommodate all the households. These changes lead utility levels *
Au   
and *
Bu  to fall, and both the housing rent  
*
HR x  and the land rent  
*R x , to increase. This is 
reflected in an upward shift of the  FR x  curve     ''  to   '  FR x FR x and an upward shift 
of the  IN x  curve       to   'IN x IN x . There are no new changes in the rest of the 
equilibrium variables, as these shifts have the same proportion.  
 
Proposition 2  
A decrease in the level of public infrastructure increases informal housing all over the city, 
making the city less tall and more spread, i.e. less compact. This in turn generates higher housing 
rents, higher land rents and smaller utility levels.   
 
An important implication of proposition 2 is that land consumption under a rapid 
proliferation of informal constructions is higher than land consumption under the 
proliferation of formal developments (recall that informal constructions are apartment’s 
buildings).  Then, proposition 2 established a clear connection between the proliferation of 
informal housing and the fast spatial expansion of the city. Precisely Inostroza, et al., (2013) 
have showed for 10 Latin American cities between 1990 and 2010, a pervasive spatial 
expansion, where most of the studied cities are expanding at fast rates. This occurs in a 
context of continuous occupation of large extensions of scarce land, by invasions, self-
constructions, and pirate developments (Smolka and  Biderman, 2011; UN-HABITAT, 2013). 
 
Proposition 2 also illustrates how the increase in the informality becomes costly for the 
society.  Because the growth of informal constructions implies fast land consumption, the city 
fringe quickly gets farther from the CBD. This in turn implies a higher urban costs30 and lower 
consumption for all city inhabitants. At the end a higher level of informality implies a lower 
level of the utility in the equilibrium. The model also explains the fact that the informal sector 
fixes a lower limit for land prices, raising the land price for the formal sector (Smolka, 2003). 
It is worth noticing that a rise in the level of taxes t  affects the land demand conditions in the 
same way that a fall in the infrastructure. Thus, it generates exactly the same effects described 
in proposition 2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                  
30 The urban costs are the commuting costs plus the housing rents 
  
Figure 20.  Effects of changes in the public infrastructure or the taxes 
 
  
Figure 21.  Effects of changes in the probability of detection 
 
 
3.5.2. Effects of changes in  the probability of detection of informal housing 
 
At each distance  *  0,  fx x , a rise in the probability of detection 1  , causes a fall in the 
value of the expected marginal productivity of land in the informal sector. Then, the  IN x  
curve shifts downwards in Figure 21       to   ''IN x IN x . It is easy to see that this lowers 
the land rent  *R x  and the land allocated to the informal sector  *INL x . As a consequence, 
both the total housing production  *Q x  and the average height of buildings  *q x  increase. 
Then, the frontier  *bx  and the city fringe 
*
fx  fall, and the equilibrium utility levels 
*
Au   and 
*
Bu   
increase. All these changes cause the housing rent  *HR x  to fall, which in turn leads the land 
rent  *R x  to fall again. This is reflected in a downward shift of the  FR x  curve 
      to   '  FR x FR x and in a second downward shift of the  IN x  curve 
    ''  to   'IN x IN x . Once again, because these shifts have the same proportion, there are 
no new changes in the rest of the equilibrium variables. 
 
Proposition 3  
An improvement in the probability of detection lowers informal housing all over the city, making 
the city more compact. This implies lower housing rents, lower land rents and higher utility 
levels.  
 
3.6. The role of the local government 
 
The local government, at each x , maximizes formal housing production, using spending in 
infrastructure for public services  Z x , and spending in law enforcement  E x . The rise in 
the infrastructure for public services increases the productivity of land in the formal sector, 
whereas an increase in law enforcement increases the probability of detection (which is now 
endogenous) of the informal land developer, according to:   
 
 
   



x E x . (2.90) 
 
At each x , the government is subject to a budget constraint that establishes that the taxes paid 
by formal land developers plus the fines charged to informal land developers must be higher 
than or equal to the total spending. The tax rate and the level of fines are exogenous. Recall 
that we assumed that the punishment to the informal developers was the confiscation of all its 
income. This confiscation can be easily decomposed in tax payments and a fine: t  where 
 1 1t   . We will now incorporate this formulation in order to facilitate the calibration 
necessary to solve the model later.  
 
The economy works sequentially. First, the government chooses the level of spending in law 
enforcement and the level of spending in infrastructure for public services. Then, given these 
variables and the taxes, the land market equilibrium is established at each x . This resembles 
the sequence of the Stackelberg model of oligopoly. Then, in order to fully characterize the 
equilibrium at each x ; we proceed using backward induction. Let  
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government’s problem is:  
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  at each     0, , fx x   
  (2.92) 
where zP  and EP  are the prices of the infrastructure and the enforcement, respectively.  It is 
assumed that these prices are space invariant. The first order conditions of the problem are 
given by:  
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Using (2.92), (2.93) and (2.94), it is possible to find  Z x ,  E x  and   x . Given the 
system’s complexity, it is necessary to use numerical methods in order to obtain solutions and 
make comparative statics analysis. We can now establish the spatial patterns of 
infrastructure, enforcement, informal (formal) production and total production. To proceed, 
we calibrate the model and then we show how the endogenous variables change in response 
to variations in the housing rent, which is the exogenous variable that changes with distance 
(for the local government). The total factor productivity in the formal sector is fixed at 1, 
whereas the land productivity in the informal sector is fixed at 0.5.  The tax rate is fixed at 0.3, 
and the prices for the infrastructure and the enforcement get 3 and 1 values respectively. 
Finally, the parameter for the detection technology is 0.7, whereas the parameter of the 
formal production function is fixed in 0.5. The chosen parameter values lie within the range of 
those used in Posada (2015), where the calibration is made to reproduce some aggregated 
stylized facts present in Latin American cities. Specifically the model reproduces an formality 
rate of 35% in the housing market. This is precisely the situation for Colombia where 
historically only 35% of houses have been formally generated (Minvivienda, Gobierno de 
Colombia, 2010). Figure 22 shows the results of the analysis.   
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Figure 22.  Endogenous spatial patterns of the infrastructure and the enforcement 
 
As can be seen, infrastructure, formal housing production, and total housing production all 
increase with the housing rent. Given that housing rents decrease with distance from the CBD, 
it follows immediately that these variables decrease with distance. This, in turn, implies that 
informal housing increases with distance. Regarding enforcement, it is easy to see that 
increases with distance. These results can be explained as follows: when the housing rent 
decreases, so it does the tax revenue, then, the government, trying to compensate this fall, 
increases enforcement. However, there is a net fall in government’s income, which generates a 
decrease in the optimal level of infrastructure. As shown before, this raises the informality 
and reduces housing production. It is clear then, that the spatial pattern of the infrastructure 
is not necessarily the result of the lack of responsiveness of the government to the fast urban 
growth. Instead, it is the result of an optimal decision of the government, taken under 
resource restrictions. Then, the government is an active (endogenous) player in the 
determination of the level of informality.   
 
3.7. Informal housing, city growth and rural urban migration 
 
The seminal paper of Harris and Todaro (1970) was the first one to model rural urban 
migration in a context of urban unemployment. This analysis has been very useful to 
understand the case of developing countries where rural urban migration is a major source of 
city growth. The model starts with the assumption that expected urban earnings are higher 
than rural earnings. Because of this, migration emerges and only stops when the expected 
earnings are equal. In the model, the unemployment rate is the equilibrating mechanism 
because when the urban population increases, the urban unemployment rises, which in turn 
pushes the expected urban earnings downwards.  
 
The work of Harris-Todaro improved significantly the understanding of the role of the 
unemployment in the path of migration and city growth, but says nothing about the role of the 
land market. Brueckner (1990) takes a first step in this direction and provides a rural urban 
migration model with an alternative equilibrating force: the escalation of urban costs. In 
short, when the city grows, the fringe gets farther from the CBD. Then, the worker who is 
farther away from the CBD has to incur in higher commuting costs. As a consequence, the 
housing rent and the equilibrium urban cost rise for all workers. Although the model of 
Brueckner (1990) takes into account the role of the land market, it does not consider its 
peculiarities in developing countries.  In this section, we take a first step in this direction and 
study the relationship between informal housing, city growth (close city) and rural urban 
migration (open city). 
 
3.7.1. Effects of changes in population and housing consumption 
 
A rise in the number of type A households AM , a rise in the number of type B  households  
BM , or an increase in the housing consumption of type B  households d  causes a rise in total 
housing demand. Starting from the existing city fringe, the overall housing production has to 
increase in order to accommodate the new housing requirements in the city. Because the 
endowment of the public good decreases with distance, the rise in housing production is 
largely informal. Then, the city rapidly spreads to a new city fringe farther to the CBD. This 
can be seen formally by using (2.89). Finally, the utility levels *
Au   and 
*
Bu   fall and the housing 
rent  *HR x   and the land rent  
*R x  increase. 
 
Proposition 4  
Population growth generates a fast proliferation of informal housing.   
 
It has been accepted that one of the main reasons behind the configuration of slum 
settlements in cities in Latin America is the sustained city growth (in part because the 
voluminous rural-urban migration) combined with poverty and land use regulations (Da 
Mata, 2013).  The result in proposition 4 describes a new mechanism through which city 
growth stimulates the proliferation of informality in the city. When the population grows, 
there is a new demand for housing services which is attended by the housing industry at the 
city fringe. Because at the city fringe there is a poor dotation of infrastructure, the new 
constructions are predominately informal. Therefore, in this mechanism, the slow growth of 
the infrastructure in the urban space plays a crucial role.  The result resumed in proposition 4 
is precisely a common observation in cities in the developing world. For instance, World Bank, 
(1993), and UN-HABITAT, (2013) have been argued that slow infrastructure growth, 
combined with fast population growth results in the proliferation of informal settlements. 
Also Williamson, (1991), shows that:  “The rapid growth in population is not matched by 
growth in delivery of land for housing, services, utilities and infrastructure important to 
sustain a reasonable quality of life. This is evident from the sprawl of informal settlements, 
increase in congestion, air and water pollution, poor and deteriorating infrastructure, and 
dilapidated housing”. 
 
3.7.2. Rural urban migration: informal housing in an open city 
 
Now, we consider that the composite non-housing good may be produced in two regions: 
urban and rural. The total population is denoted with N  and the urban population with N . 
Then, the rural population is given by N N . The urban region takes the form of a city like 
the one described in previous sections of the document. In the rural region, workers do not 
commute because they live close the fields that they cultivate. As a consequence, the urban 
cost (the commuting cost plus the housing rent) is higher than the rural cost (rural workers 
pay the rural rent for the land they consume). For simplicity, it is assumed that now in the city 
there is only one household type (the A type), and that the infrastructure endowment does not 
change with distance to the CBD. Because cities tend to host modern productive sectors, the 
urban productivity y is higher than the rural productivity ry . As before, the indirect utility for 
a worker is given by the difference between the wage and the cost of living. Initially, the urban 
utility is higher than the rural utility; therefore incentives for rural urban migration exist. The 
rural urban migration guarantees that in equilibrium the utility for a rural worker is equal to 
the utility for an urban worker.  
 
Because informal housing directly affects the urban cost, and our main purpose is to study the 
implication of informal housing on rural urban - migration and city growth, we focus on the 
urban cost as an equilibrating mechanism. The equilibrium housing production at each x  and 
the city fringe are now given by: 
 
 /1* 1/[(1 ) / 1 (1 / ]] )[IN F INQ A Z t A A t
    

     .  (2.95) 
 
 
*
*f
N
x
Q
 . (2.96) 
As a consequence, the migration equilibrium condition can be written as: 
 
 
* r
N
y y
Q
   , (2.97) 
where  *N Q  is the equilibrium urban cost. This condition guarantees that the rural utility 
is equal that to the urban utility.  Reorganizing (3) we can obtain the equilibrium urban 
population:  
 
 
  *ry y Q
N


 . (2.98) 
Now it is possible to study the effects of changes in the city's parameters on the level of urban 
population.  When the infrastructure decreases (or the taxes increases, or the probability of 
detection decreases), informal housing production increases. Then, at each distance x , 
buildings grow shorter. As a consequence, the city fringe gets farther from the CBD, the urban 
cost rises,  and the urban utility falls. This stimulates a decrease in urban population, which in 
turn reduces the urban cost to the point where the city and the rural area are equally 
attractive again. At the end, the city fringe and the urban utility do not change, but the urban 
population falls. The previous analysis illustrates in a simple and intuitive way how the informal 
housing becomes an obstacle for more people to enjoy the advantages to live in a city.   
 
Finally, it is easy to see that the urban population and the city fringe (city size) increase with 
the productivity in the urban sector, and decrease with the productivity in the rural sector, 
and the commuting cost per unit of distance.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.8. Conclusions 
 
Cities in Latin America are often characterized by fast spatial expansion, low buildings height 
and by peripheries where low- income workers and precarious short buildings are 
concentrated (UN-HABITAT, 2010; Zenou, 2011; Da Mata, 2013, Inostroza, et al., 2013). In 
explaining of these patterns, previous literature has stressed the role of rural-urban 
migration, under high unemployment, as the main force behind the emergence of the 
periphery and the large city size (Harris and Todaro, 1970; Zenou, 2011), or the role of the 
migration, under agglomeration economies, in turning cities into megacities (Krugman, 1991). 
However, less attention has been paid to the role of informal housing.   
 
This paper develops a monocentric city model with a formal and an informal sector in the 
housing industry.  Here, informal land developers, evading regulations, using inefficient 
techniques, and using land that could have been used by the more efficient formal sector, find 
it profitable to produce a perfect substitute for formal production. In contrast with the Muth-
Mills model, the model developed in the present work states that the relative price of land 
does not necessarily change with distance, implying that the traditional reason for a 
systematic variation of the buildings height over the urban space does not exist. However, a 
clear spatial pattern emerges. Given that the infrastructure for public services decreases with 
distance to the CBD, the land allocated to produce short informal (tall formal) buildings 
increases (decreases) with the distance to the CBD, implying that the average tallness of 
buildings decrease with the distance to the CBD. Then, the city periphery shows high levels of 
housing informality. This mechanism, which is new in the literature, can be suitable for 
explaining spatial regularities in developing world cities.  
 
The model shows that a city with a low provision of infrastructure (or high taxes or low law 
enforcement) displays a high level of informal housing. This creates a city with a large size 
and a low buildings height. In turn, this implies high land rents, high housing rents and a low 
utility level in equilibrium for the city inhabitants. This result establishes a clear connection 
between the proliferation of informal housing and the fast spatial expansion of cities, two of 
the most important features exhibited by a representative city in Latin-America. It also 
illustrates how the increases in informality become costly for the society through its negative 
impact in the equilibrium utility levels for all the households. Finally, the model shows that 
the spatial pattern of the infrastructure is not necessarily the result of an (exogenous) lack of 
responsiveness of the State to the fast urban growth. Instead, it is an (endogenous) optimal 
response of the local government to the way how tax revenues and fines revenues change 
with distance to the city center. 
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